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E-VAT: An Electronically Collected
Progressive Consumption Tax
By Daniel S. Goldberg
Daniel S. Goldberg is a professor of law at the
University of Maryland School of Law.
This report proposes replacing the income tax
with an electronic, progressive consumption tax that
couples a credit-method VAT (modified for wages)
with a progressive wage tax. I have called this
proposal e-VAT (a convenient contraction for an
electronic value added tax), because it is based on a
business-level credit VAT and can be collected automatically and electronically at the point of sale.
The essential advantage of e-VAT over the HallRabushka flat tax is that e-VAT’s use of a credit VAT
as its foundation facilitates automatic and electronic
collection of the tax. A credit VAT lends itself to
electronic monitoring and auditing by the IRS. In
contrast, the Hall-Rabushka flat tax uses a
subtraction-method VAT and therefore would require annual collection, miring it in 20th century
technology. The e-VAT would avoid annual collection, a manual and time-consuming audit process,
and reliance on self-reporting by taxpayers, all failings that the flat tax would share with the current
income tax.
The report provides an explanation of how the
e-VAT system would operate, achieve progressivity,
and deal with the problems that currently plague the
income tax system like systemic tax cheating and the
resulting tax gap. Electronic assessment and collection in an economy like ours in which most significant transactions are done electronically allow for
easy compliance and monitoring by the IRS.
The report also explains how e-VAT would allow
for an estate tax that is free from the complaint of the

estate tax’s current critics — that it represents a
second tax on saved income and is therefore unfair.
Under e-VAT, the estate tax would be the only tax on
saved income.
In addition, e-VAT is destination based and would
be consistent with the taxing method used in virtually the entire industrialized world. As such, it
would eliminate the competitive price disadvantage
that U.S. exports have compared with VAT-collecting
jurisdictions’ manufactured goods. This competitive
disadvantage results from the fact that U.S. goods
incur, and therefore absorb and include in their
prices, the U.S. corporate income tax imposed on the
U.S. producers, as well as the VAT owed when the
importer sells the U.S. goods in those VAT destinations. Under destination-based e-VAT, as a replacement for the corporate tax, U.S. export goods would
not have to include in their prices a U.S. corporate
tax on top of the destination-based foreign VAT.
This report is a portion of a book by the author
that critically examines the current income tax system. The book describes the shortcomings of the
income tax and suggests a consumption tax as a
replacement for it. The book then provides background regarding the single-tier alternative consumption taxes that can be assessed and collected at
the individual and business levels and observes that
the current income tax contains provisions from
several of these consumption tax methods, so that a
shift to a consumption tax would not be as revolutionary regarding burden-sharing as might appear.
The book concludes with the material in this report,
proposing e-VAT.
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I. Introduction to a Two-Tier Consumption Tax
In general, a consumption tax can be structured using
alternative forms. The forms that are generally discussed
as replacements for the income tax are consumed income
tax, yield exemption tax, business-level retail sales tax,
business-level credit VAT, and business-level subtraction
VAT.
The consumed income tax and yield exemption tax
foresee the collection of tax annually from individuals
based on income or receipts and thus appear closely
related to the current income tax. These methods impose
the tax on individuals by requiring them to pay tax when
they earn income or spend previously accumulated earnings. In figures 1(a) and (b), this tax would be imposed at
point 1.
The other three forms of consumption tax — retail
sales tax, credit VAT, and subtraction-method VAT —
collect tax at the business level. These methods impose
the tax on sellers. The tax is thereby added to the buyer’s
cost of the product or service purchased, either as an
express add-on, like a typical state retail sales tax, or as a
component of the producer’s costs, like the VATs. In
figures 1(a) and (b), this tax would be imposed at point 2
(or possibly points 3 or 4 in Figure 1(b)).
Figure 1(a) is a schematic that depicts the flow of
funds in a simplified economy, without Government (G),
Taxes (T), Imports (IM), or Exports (X). It thus presents
the equivalency of National Income (Y) and Consumption (C) plus Investment (I). Points 1 and 2 in Figure 1(a)
represent alternative points to collect taxes. Point 1
depicts the collection of tax from individuals, who are
both wage earners and owners of capital and thus are
entitled to wages and returns on capital like interest and
profits. Point 2 depicts the collection of tax from businesses, which receive Consumption (C) and Investment
(I) expenditures from customers. The figure is based on
the following equivalency: C+I=Y.
Figure 1(b) adds to the graphic Government, Taxes
and Transfer Payments, and Imports and Exports. Points
1 and 2 nevertheless remain at the same places, indicating
the alternative points in the cycle where taxes could be
collected. Points 3 and 4 are also possible tax collection
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points, depending on whether government purchases are
subjected to tax and whether the tax excludes exports but
includes imports.
The concept of a two-tier variation of a VAT involves
imposing some of the tax at both points in figures 1(a)
and (b). Importantly, all of the methods of taxation
identified above tax personal consumption. However,
these methods differ regarding where they impose the
‘‘legal incidence’’ of the tax.
Before this report progresses any further, I should
explain what constitutes ‘‘legal incidence’’ and ‘‘economic incidence’’ of tax. An example will help explain
how these terms apply in the context of a simple sales tax.
If the federal government were to decide to impose a
$0.60 per gallon tax on gasoline, it could do so in two
ways.1 First, the federal government could impose that
tax on the gasoline seller so that for each gallon of
gasoline sold, the seller is liable for the $0.60 tax.2 To a
casual observer, it would appear that the seller bears the
burden of that tax, because the seller has the legal
obligation to pay the tax. One would thus say that the
legal incidence of the tax is on the seller.3
Alternatively, the federal government could impose
the statutory burden of the tax on the gasoline buyer by
requiring the buyer to pay an additional $0.60 for each
gallon of gasoline purchased.4 Under this scenario, a
casual observer would view the buyer as bearing the
burden of the tax, because the buyer has the legal
obligation to pay the tax. One would thus say that the
legal incidence of the tax is on the buyer.5
However, in fact, both of these situations are economically equivalent,6 because $0.60 is paid to the government
on each gallon of gasoline sold. How the actual economic
burden of the tax is shared between the buyer and the
seller under either of these situations cannot be determined without analyzing the effect of the tax on the price
of the gasoline.
Assume that the seller has the legal responsibility to
pay the tax. If the price of gasoline increases by the same
$0.60 for which the seller is legally liable on the sale of a
gallon of gasoline, one can conclude that the buyer bears
the economic burden of the tax.7 One would say that the
economic incidence of the tax falls on the buyer. In
contrast, if the price to the buyer remains the same
because the seller absorbs the entire tax without increasing the price, one can conclude that the economic incidence of the tax falls entirely on the seller.8 However, if
the seller could pass only a portion of the tax to the buyer,
the economic incidence of the tax would be shared by the

1
See Harvey S. Rosen, Public Finance 260-263 (5th ed. 1999);
Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics 289-291 (4th ed. 1996).
2
See Rosen, supra note 1, at 262 (illustrating legal incidence of
tax on seller).
3
Id.
4
Id. at 260 (illustrating legal incidence of tax on buyer).
5
See Varian, supra note 1, at 290-291.
6
Id. at 289-291 (demonstrating mathematically this equivalence); see also Rosen, supra note 1, at 260-263.
7
See Varian, supra note 1, at 290.
8
Id.
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buyer and the seller, even though the legal incidence is
imposed entirely on the seller.9
A similar analysis can be used if the legal incidence of
the tax is imposed only on the buyer.10 The results
regarding the distribution of the burden between the
buyer and the seller will be identical.11 Because the legal
incidence of a tax does not determine its economic
incidence, the tax is more properly described as imposed
on transactions rather than on the buyer or the seller.
Thus, in analyzing the distributional effect of a tax, one
must look past the legal incidence of the tax to the
economic incidence.12 One cannot determine the amount
of tax shifting that will occur a priori, that is, without
understanding how the markets will establish the total
price — including the tax — of each gallon of gasoline.13
Because this example involved a single rate tax in a sales
transaction, legal incidence did not affect economic incidence.
However, legal incidence is not always irrelevant. For
example, a tax on business may be easier to collect than
a tax on individuals, so the legal incidence of the sales tax
in the example should be imposed on the business
taxpayers who may or may not be able to pass it along to
buyers. It would be a nightmare to depend on buyers to
pay the tax voluntarily.
Also, legal incidence of a tax can make a difference if
the tax allows rates to vary among taxpayers and thereby

9

Id. at 298-295.
Id. at 290.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 293-295.
13
See Rosen, supra note 1, at 263-265.
10
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Producers

determines the distribution of tax burdens. For example,
if tax rates vary between sellers and individual consumers, imposing a tax on consumers rather than sellers
is likely to affect the aggregate amount of tax collected.
Similarly, if tax rates vary among individual consumers,
taxing only consumers will distribute the tax burdens
among them in proportion to their respective tax rates. In
contrast, imposing the tax only on sellers would affect all
individual consumers in the same amount, having the
effect of a flat tax rate on consumers. Consequently, the
choice of the legal incidence of a tax on consumption
could affect burden sharing, consumer choices, and other
resource allocations in the economy.
Under the consumed income and yield exemption
taxes, the individual taxpayer is legally responsible for
paying the tax. Progressivity can thus be built into the tax
rates and thereby affect the economic incidence of the tax
and the burden sharing among individual taxpayers.
Under the business-level consumption tax — which
includes the retail sales tax, credit VAT, and subtractionmethod VAT — the sellers of goods and services have the
legal responsibility to pay the tax. For individual consumers, this would translate to a flat rate tax on consumption expenditures, because sellers will charge the
same price to all individual consumers and the tax will
affect those consumers by the same amount.
This discussion demonstrates that graduated rates can
most easily be accomplished by imposing the consumption tax on individuals, as is done under the consumed
income and yield exemption models. However, these
methods also lend themselves to additional personalization, such as allowing deductions for charitable contributions, home mortgage interest, and the myriad of other
personal and tax expenditure deductions allowable under the current income tax. This would not necessarily be
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Figure 1(a). Simplified Production and Consumption Cycle
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a good thing. Indeed, the potential for overpersonalization may cause one to favor one of the business VAT
forms. Even though business-level taxes are largely free
from personalization at the individual level, they are not
readily adaptable to progressivity. Progressivity in the tax
system is a likely sine qua non to congressional acceptance.
There is one important caveat to the foregoing assertion that progressivity cannot easily be incorporated into
business-level tax systems. Although VATs preclude progressivity at the individual consumer level as a practical
matter as well as many of the other personalization
features, VATs can indirectly affect the tax burdensharing among economic classes of individuals by using
different tax rates for different goods and services. Lower
tax rates could be imposed on staples in comparison with
luxury items. European countries, for example, impose
different VAT rates on different products, adding substantial complexity to the European business VATs. Taxes
imposed directly on consumers do not lend themselves to
this type of product differentiation.

A. E-VAT — a Two-Tier Consumption Tax
The features of an individual-level tax and a businesslevel tax can be combined into a two-tier consumption
tax. Robert Hall and Alvin Rabushka recognized this
possibility and acknowledged the significance of legal
incidence. They devised a two-tier consumption tax
system, discussed in their groundbreaking book The Flat
Tax. The Hall-Rabushka flat tax is a two-tier variation of
the subtraction-method VAT, under which the businesslevel portion of the tax allows a deduction for wages as if
they were purchases of materials and the wages are taxed
1354

separately to the wage earners.14 Thus, under the HallRabushka flat tax, the legal incidence is divided, with
sellers bearing legal responsibility for the entire business
level tax, excluding the portion of the tax attributable to
wages. The proposal leaves the wage earners to bear the
legal incidence of the wage portion of the tax. However,
the tax base under the flat tax is the same as under a VAT.
Also, the economic incidence of the flat tax would be the
same as the economic incidence of all of the forms of VAT,
assuming that the tax rates imposed on the wage portion
of the flat tax were the same as the tax rate imposed on
the nonwage portion of the flat tax. Thus, as long as all
tax rates are uniform and the wage tax portion is unadulterated with special tax rates, exemptions, or deductions,
the two-tier legal incidence of the flat tax will not affect
its economic incidence — that is, it will not affect who
actually bears the economic burden of the tax through
reduced wealth.
The Hall-Rabushka flat tax proposal sought to tax
wages at the same rate as the business portion VAT rate.
It was this idea of a single tax rate applicable to both
businesses and wage earners and a tax without graduated rates that garnered the publicity regarding the
proposal. The publicity and reaction to the single or
‘‘flat’’ rate of the proposal eclipsed its brilliant advance in
thinking: Namely, that one could divide the legal incidence of tax between businesses and wage earners to

14
Robert E. Hall and Alvin Rabushka, The Flat Tax 62 (2d ed.
1995).
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Figure 1(b). Production and Consumption Cycle
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15

Id.
Id. at 58-59.
17
David Bradford, ‘‘Blueprint for Fundamental Tax Reform,’’
26 Brooklyn J. Int’l L. 1449 (2001).
18
David Bradford wrote extensively about this proposal,
most recently in Bradford, ‘‘A System for the Twenty-First
Century,’’ in Toward Fundamental Tax Reform 11, 13-29 (2005).
This was his last writing before his untimely death.
19
Id. Under Bradford’s most recent modification, the X-Tax
could capture the receipt of a worker’s qualified retirement
savings in the individual’s tax base without having to view it as
a type of deferred wages, which would be the case if the
compensation tax component took the form of a wage tax under
which investment returns were excluded from the tax base.
20
See Daniel S. Goldberg, ‘‘E Tax: The Flat Tax as an Electronic Credit VAT,’’ Tax Notes, Sept. 5, 2005, p. 1168, Doc
2005-17667, or 2005 TNT 172-21.
16
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automatic and electronic collection of the tax.21 In contrast, because the flat tax uses a subtraction-method VAT,
it would require annual collection, miring it in 20thcentury technology. Moreover, e-VAT also lends itself to
electronic monitoring and, as a two-tier tax, can be made
progressive. Section II of this report discusses e-VAT in
detail and proposes it as the successor to the income tax.
An example will demonstrate how these two-tier
consumption tax proposals collect the same tax as the
business-level VATs, which impose the tax on sellerproducers exclusively. The one difference is that these
two-tier taxes separate out the portion of the tax attributable to wages and then impose that portion on the
wage earner. Thus, the legal incidence of the two-tier
consumption tax is divided between sellers and wage
earners.
This difference can be understood best by comparing a
subtraction-method VAT with the flat tax and e-VAT
using the example of manufacturer Manny, retailer Roy,
wage earner Winifred, and a tax-inclusive VAT rate of 20
percent. Under the flat tax, Manny would include sales
proceeds of $70 in his tax base but would be taxed only
on $60, because he would be allowed a deduction for the
$10 of wages paid to Winifred. Manny would thus be
liable for $12 of tax instead of the $14 that he would owe
under a subtraction-method VAT. However, unlike the
regular subtraction-method VAT, Winifred would be subject to tax on her wages. If the wage tax were set at a flat
20 percent, Winifred would be liable for tax of $2. Retailer
Roy would pay tax of $6 on a tax base of $100 less $70 and
would be unaffected by this nuance, because he did not
pay any wages. Thus, the total tax under both a
subtraction-method VAT and the two-tier flat tax would
be $20: ($14 + $6) under the subtraction-method VAT, and
($12 + $2 + $6) under the flat tax, as presented in Table 1.
By shifting to Winifred the legal incidence of the tax on
the wage portion of the value added, the tax on her can
be made more flexible. A zero tax rate can be built into
the wage tax schedule, and personal exemption and tax
expenditure deductions can be allowed in computing
Winifred’s taxable wage base.
The e-VAT is a two-tier tax like the flat tax. Similar to
the flat tax, the e-VAT separates out wages and taxes
employees on those wages under a wage tax while
eliminating wages from the credit VAT base. Thus, Winifred, as under the flat tax, would be subject to a wage tax
of $2 ($10 x 20 percent). Unlike the flat tax, however, the
e-VAT employs a credit-invoice VAT instead of a
subtraction-method VAT to tax businesses. Consequently,
in the example, under the credit VAT portion of the e-VAT
(in its most basic form), Manny would pay a VAT of $14
($70 x 20 percent) as the first part of the computation.
Manny would then be allowed a credit for the wages
paid multiplied by the VAT rate, which would compute
to a credit of $2 ($10 x 20 percent); this would be the
amount of wage tax imposed on Winifred. As explained
before, if the wage tax were imposed at a flat 20 percent,
the $2 credit would equal the amount that Winifred
would pay in wage tax, thereby preserving the central

21

Id.
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achieve the benefits of a business-level tax with a modicum of personalization at the wage earner level.
Hall and Rabushka proposed that the wage portion of
their tax should use a flat rate equal to the VAT rate, with
a limited zero bracket amount and limited individual
deductions.15 They have expressed regret, however, regarding their decision to call their proposal ‘‘The Flat
Tax,’’ admitting that the name is flawed because the ‘‘flat
tax’’ part of the label hides its most important attribute —
that the proposal is a consumption tax.
The Hall-Rabushka flat tax could be modified. In point
of fact, the tax rates at the business level and at the
individual level need not be the same. Rather, under the
two-tier structure, wage earners could be taxed on those
wages at graduated or flat rates, with or without a zero
bracket amount, personal exemptions, and personal deductions.16
David Bradford built on the Hall-Rabushka two-tier
concept, proposing a two-tier variation of the businesslevel subtraction-method VAT, which he called the ‘‘XTax.’’17 The X-Tax did not suffer from the naming
problem associated with the flat tax because, unlike the
words ‘‘flat tax,’’ X-Tax has no apparent independent
meaning. Bradford’s proposed tax consists of a modified
subtraction-method VAT on the business side in which
wages are allowed as deductions and the remaining base
is taxed at a single rate, coupled with a graduated-rate
wage tax on the individual side in which the top tax rate
is set at the VAT rate.18 Most recently, Bradford suggested
that the compensation tax component should depart
from a wage tax and instead should take the form of a
cash flow consumed income tax.19
Both the flat tax and the X-Tax have the drawback of
being based on a subtraction-method VAT. However,
these proposals represent advances in thinking that lead
one to consider yet another variation of a two-tier consumption tax.
This report proposes coupling a credit VAT with a
progressive wage tax. I have called this proposal ‘‘eVAT,’’ because it is based on a business-level credit VAT
and can be collected automatically and electronically at
the point of sale.20 The essential advantage of e-VAT over
the flat tax is that e-VAT’s use of the credit VAT facilitates
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Manufacturer Manny
Retailer Roy
Employee/Wage Earner Winifred
Total Tax

Subtraction
VAT

Flat Tax

Retail Sales
Tax

Credit VAT

E-VAT

14
6
0
20

12
6
2
20

0
20
0
20

14
6
0
20

12
6
2
20

feature of the VAT. Again, Roy would continue to pay $6,
unaffected by this nuance. Thus, as outlined in Table 1, a
total tax under the e-VAT of $20 would be paid.
The table above provides a comparison among the two
styles of two-tier consumption taxes discussed in this
section and the three forms of business-level consumption taxes.
These two-tier consumption taxes should not be confused with a hybrid income-consumption tax just because the legal incidence of the tax is partly on wages,
which for individual taxpayers is a component of income.
The flat tax, X-Tax, and e-VAT are every bit consumption
taxes, augmented with some algebraic magic. They start
with a business-level consumption tax and subtract
wages, which are simply taxed in the hands of wage
earners. Wage earners would be expected to be paid
sufficiently higher wages than under a pure businesslevel consumption tax in order to compensate them for
bearing the legal incidence of the wage portion of the
consumption tax.
The closest to an official pronouncement of a two-tier
tax proposal was the growth and investment tax (GIT) by
President George W. Bush’s Advisory Panel on Federal
Tax Reform. The GIT was the latest version of a modified
consumption tax that emerged as a result of a Treasurysponsored advisory panel analysis of a quasiconsumption tax that was believed to be politically
sellable. Working with that constraint, the tax reform
panel issued in November 2005 what it termed a ‘‘simple,
fair, and pro-growth’’ set of ‘‘proposals to fix America’s
tax system.’’ This is somewhat of an exaggeration, I
would say, at the risk of understatement. Bush’s proposal
combined a subtraction-method VAT at the business level
with a mix of Bradford’s X-Tax and modest tax on
investment earnings at the individual level. It also contained a substantial amount of detail within the proposals to make it more than a mere blueprint for reform.
Rather, it was an actual implementable proposal ready
for serious consideration by Treasury and Congress,
although the proposal never really received this consideration.
Importantly, the panel declined to propose a pure
consumption tax successor to the income tax. The panel
was not even empowered to consider a system based on
a credit VAT, which was deemed unacceptable from the
get-go and was taken off the table immediately. Hamstrung in this way, along with other compromises
deemed politically necessary, the panel’s product was
criticized for seeking to replace the mess of the current
income tax with a newly created mess. That criticism
made any expenditure of effort to try to enact the
proposal not likely to be productive or worthwhile.
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B. Summary and Observations
Among the various methods of implementing a consumption tax, which one should be chosen? That depends on how important some tax aspects are to the
chooser. If an easily understandable shift from an income
tax were desired and graduated rates were essential, the
consumed income or yield exemption models work best.
If reducing administrative costs of the tax were most
important, a credit VAT point-of-sale system would work
best. E-VAT, the system proposed in this report, would
accomplish both of those objectives.
II. E-VAT: Electronic, Progressive Consumption Tax
A. Introduction
More than 35 years of experience with the income tax
has taught me that the income tax is structurally flawed
and needlessly complicated, contains perverse incentives
against saving and investment, fails to use modern
technology to ease compliance and collection burdens,
and is subject to congressional micromanaging.22 These
problems, in turn, lead to noncompliance with the income tax and to large costs required to run the tax
system.
Substantial consideration (not reproduced in this article) has caused me to believe that the solution to these
problems is the adoption of a consumption tax. Replacing
the current income tax with a consumption tax would not
be nearly as dramatic a leap as is generally assumed,
because the current income tax is actually a hybrid
income-consumption tax.23
This section describes the best replacement for the
income tax among the consumption tax alternatives:
e-VAT.
E-VAT is the best choice for a replacement consumption tax because it combines straightforward concepts
with appropriate use of technology to achieve ease,
efficiency, and certainty of compliance and collection. Yet
to individual taxpayers, it appears to be a simplified
version of the current income tax, making it relatively
painless to accept. Further, because it is progressive, it
allows for flexibility to achieve desired burden-sharing
without the perverse incentives against saving and investment inherent in the income tax. Does that sound
good? Let’s take a look at it.
E-VAT is a two-tier progressive consumption tax that
is based on a credit-method VAT. It is based on, but

22
This section is based on Goldberg, supra note 20, and
Goldberg, ‘‘E-Tax: Fundamental Tax Reform and the Transition
to a Currency-Free Economy,’’ 20 Va. Tax Rev. 1-74 (2000).
23
See Goldberg, ‘‘The U.S. Consumption Tax: Evolution, Not
Revolution,’’ 57 Tax Law. 1 (2003).
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E-VAT treats wages as if they were a purchase of a
service from another business firm. Thus, e-VAT allows a
credit for the VAT paid on those wages. A simple
credit-method VAT, in contrast, does not allow a credit
with regard to wages. Similarly, the flat tax allows a
deduction for wages as if they were purchases of materials by the employer26 while a simple subtractionmethod VAT does not. Under both e-VAT and the flat tax,
wage earners would be taxed on their wages at rates that
could be set as graduated or flat, with or without a zero
rate bracket amount, personal exemptions, and personal
deductions.
E-VAT, the flat tax, and the X-Tax share a distinguishing feature. By allowing a business-level VAT credit for
wages in the case of e-VAT, or a deduction for wages in
the case of the flat tax and X-Tax but taxing those wages
at the individual wage earner level, all of these two-tier
taxes divide the tax into two distinct parts: a businesslevel tax, which is imposed on a traditional VAT base but
modified for wages, and a wage tax at the individual
level. Progressivity can be built into the system by using
a graduated rate system for the wage tax. The tax can also
be personalized by allowing personal exemptions and tax
expenditure deductions from the wage tax, although the
tax need not be personalized in this manner.
E-VAT is superior to the other two-tier systems because it uses a credit-method VAT as the business-level
tax instead of a subtraction-method VAT. This feature
allows it to be collected automatically and electronically.

24
Section I presents the method of a subtraction-method VAT
as well as other forms of a consumption tax, including the
Hall-Rabushka flat tax. This section discusses the relationship
among them.
25
Hall and Rabushka proposed a flat rate equal to the VAT
rate, with a zero bracket amount, personal exemptions, and
limited individual deductions. Hall and Rabushka, supra note
14, at 55-64. Bradford proposed another two-tier consumption
tax, which he called the ‘‘X-Tax.’’ Bradford, supra note 17, at
1449. On the business side, the X-Tax also consists of a modified
subtraction-method VAT in which wages are allowed as deductions and the remaining base is taxed at a single rate. Id. at 1451.
However, on the individual side, the X-Tax couples the subtraction VAT with a graduated rate wage tax in which the top tax
rate is set at the VAT rate. Id. at 1450. Bradford wrote extensively
on this proposal, supra note 18, at 13-29. In this publication, he
suggested that the compensation tax component of the X-Tax
should depart from a wage tax, and should instead take the
form of a cash flow consumed income tax. Id. at 13-14. Bradford
noted that his X-Tax could capture the drawdown of a worker’s
qualified retirement savings in the individual’s tax base without
having to view it as a type of deferred wages, which would be
the case if the compensation tax component took the form of a
wage tax, under which investment returns would be excluded
from the tax base. Id. at 18-19.
26
Hall and Rabushka, supra note 14, at 62.

B. E-VAT at the Business Level
E-VAT avoids the administrative costs of annual accounting and collection by using a modified creditinvoice VAT instead of a subtraction-method VAT as its
structural foundation. The business-level credit-method
VAT would be a point of sale or transaction tax, which
could be collected in each transaction rather than on an
annual basis. E-VAT combines a single rate credit-invoice
VAT, modified for wages, with a progressive wage tax to
build in progressivity. This two-tier structure based on a
credit VAT facilitates both progressivity and the pay-asyou-go collection system of a transaction tax. Transaction
taxes impose an automatic framework to the taxing
process because they lend themselves to electronic tracking and tax collection. E-VAT would thus be an appropriate name for the proposal.
A credit VAT, the foundation of e-VAT, can be inexpensive, accurate, and virtually leakproof in an economy
in which money transfers take place electronically. To
illustrate this point, consider customer Swoozy’s retail
purchase of shoes from retailer Roy in the foregoing
example. When Swoozy’s debit card is swiped to make
the purchase — which is processed electronically — Roy
in effect gains access to Swoozy’s bank account. The
appropriate amount, including the VAT, would be automatically withdrawn from her account. The clearing
bank, which handles the transaction electronically, would
then make an automatic entry, debiting Swoozy’s account
for the purchase price plus the VAT, crediting Roy’s
account for the purchase price and crediting the government’s tax collection account for the VAT. All of these
operations would be programmed to be part of the
clearing bank’s normal operations. Other electronic funds
transactions between businesses would work in the same
manner, even without an actual debit card.
If Swoozy chose to use a credit card instead of a debit
card, the transaction would operate in much the same
way from Swoozy’s and Roy’s points of view. The only
difference would be that the clearing bank would charge
Swoozy’s credit account for the appropriate amount,
thereby establishing a lending transaction rather than
making an immediate withdrawal from Swoozy’s bank
account. Swoozy’s account would be charged with both
the purchase price and the appropriate VAT. As in the
debit transaction, the VAT would be immediately credited to the federal government’s tax collection account.
This immediacy would make the tax collection effectively
automatic.
At the business supplier level, one would expect that
payments would be made by other electronic means
besides a debit or credit card, such as electronic funds
transfers (EFTs). Indeed, even paper checks are now
being cleared electronically27 and are thus best characterized as EFTs. Cash purchases at the noncriminal business

27
See generally Catherine Lee Wilson, ‘‘Banking on the Net:
Extending Bank Regulation to Electronic Money and Beyond,’’
30 Creighton L. Rev. 671 (1997) (describing electronic checks as
paper checks that are created and cleared electronically). This
report anticipated that paper checks would be cleared electronically in the near future because of the cost savings associated

(Footnote continued on next page.)
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represents an advance over, the flat tax, which was
originally proposed by Hall and Rabushka in 1985 and is
a two-tier consumption tax based on a subtractionmethod VAT.24 The nuance contained in both e-VAT and
the flat tax is the treatment of wages.25
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with electronic clearing as compared to manual clearing. It is
estimated that banks save approximately 80 cents for every
transaction eliminating paper checks. Christopher B. Woods,
‘‘Commercial Law: Determining Repugnancy in an Electronic
Age: Excluded Transactions Under Electronic Writing and Signature Legislation,’’ 52 Okla. L. Rev. 411, 451 (1999).
28
Appendix A presents a discussion of tax-inclusive and
tax-exclusive tax rates and their algebraic relationship. This
example could have used the economically equivalent taxexclusive tax rate of 25 percent, with the VAT added onto the
purchase price of $80, which would also generate a VAT of $20.
29
See Appendix A (explaining the mechanics of a creditinvoice VAT).
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of the VAT credit to be returned to the seller would not be
automatic, an official claim would be made for the
previously paid VAT, and proper identification of the
purchased items that gave rise to the VAT credit could be
verified electronically on audit by the taxing authority,
which would already have most of this information in its
database.30 For those purchases that were not made
electronically (that is, not using EFTs, credit or debit
cards, or checks — likely an insubstantial number of
transactions today), some actual invoice audit and verification may be required. The cost of this procedure,
however, would pale in comparison to an income tax
audit under the current system. A similar issue arises
with the seller’s reporting of its nonelectronic sales
receipts, which could be done when the sale is made or
when the seller makes cash deposits to its financial
institution.
Alternatively, sales and tax information collected by
the financial institutions involved in the transactions
could be accumulated by these institutions and transmitted to the taxing authority monthly, if it would be more
efficient. Also, these institutions could be permitted to
retain the tax funds for a specified number of days to
compensate them for their extra expenses in facilitating
the tax collections and reporting. The point here is that
there will be many details and variations in the mechanics of collecting and reporting the taxes under this
system, but the overall benefits of an electronic point-ofsale structure of the tax should be achieved.
Thus, the seller would not be required to file the
traditional annual tax return required under the income
tax. Rather, the seller would only have to file a claim for
payment of its VAT credits and to make sure that the tax
collector’s electronic records of sales, purchases, corresponding VAT collections, VAT payments, and corresponding credits match the seller’s own records, which
they would if all parties were following prescribed
procedures. Presumably, this cross-checking would be
done automatically and periodically as a matter of
course. It could be done monthly or bimonthly to correspond to the crediting procedure described above.
To be sure, this system puts a great deal of faith in
modern technology and being able to trace every transaction electronically. Even under the current income tax,
however, a great deal of faith is placed on electronic
bookkeeping. The difference is that under the proposed
system, the taxing authority has the ability to verify
almost all of the taxpayer’s VAT payment obligations and
VAT credits independently, because they are derived
from the reporting required by the transactions themselves. In contrast, under the current income tax, taxpayer representations about income and deductible

30
Social Security payroll tax payments (both the employee’s
withheld amount and the employer’s share) are coded with the
employee’s Social Security number and find their way into a
Social Security retirement benefit calculation for the employee.
If this system can work there, it can work here, as long as a
taxpayer’s employee identification number is used for all of the
sales and purchase transactions in which the taxpayer engages.
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level are rare, if existent to any extent, but could be dealt
with in the manner described later in this report for cash
retail purchases.
The numerical example discussed earlier in this report
will illustrate the mechanics of e-VAT’s tax collection.
Swoozy’s retail purchase of shoes from Roy in the
amount of $100 made by credit or debit card would be
subject to a VAT set at a tax-inclusive rate of 20 percent,
so that the stated purchase price would already include
the $20 VAT.28 When Swoozy’s credit or debit card is used
to make the purchase, an amount equal to the $100
purchase price of the item would be charged to her credit
account or subtracted from Swoozy’s bank account,
depending on her choice of purchase card. At that time,
the $20 tax portion of the charge would be credited
immediately to a tax collection account of the federal
government at the financial institution handling the
electronic bookkeeping. E-VAT would provide that the
charge be bookmarked with a taxpayer identification
number to identify the purchaser for credit. The financial
institution’s tax collection account would be transferred
either immediately or at the end of each day to a Federal
Reserve account. The procedure would be exactly the
same, regardless of whether a debit card, credit card, or
other means of EFT were used. In all cases, the tax
assessed at the point of sale on the transaction would be
immediately charged to the purchaser, Swoozy, and
credited to the government’s account. All of the parties
would know the amount of the charge that represented
the direct sales price and the amount of the charge that
represented the tax.
The transmittal of the VAT to the government is not
the end of the process for Roy, the seller. Roy would be
entitled to a credit on the VAT that he previously paid to
his supplier, Manny, in the amount of $14, based on a
purchase price of $70. That amount of $14 would have
been paid automatically and electronically to the government by Manny on his sale to Roy.29
Records of a seller’s allowable credits would be maintained because the financial institution would have previously reported — both to the seller and to the taxing
authority — the VAT paid by the seller on its initial
purchases. Each seller in the chain could retrieve its VAT
credit by filing a claim for the VAT previously paid. The
taxing authority would then credit the seller’s bank
account with the amount of its allowable VAT credit. This
credit procedure could take place monthly or bimonthly,
or perhaps even more frequently. While the identification
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31
See Reuven Avi-Yonah, ‘‘Risk, Rents, and Regressivity:
Why the United States Needs Both an Income Tax and a VAT,’’
Tax Notes, Dec. 20, 2004, p. 1651, Doc 2004-23199, or 2004 TNT
245-37.
32
See generally 3 Treasury Department, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth (1984). The cost of
capital is fully deductible only in a consumption-style VAT, not
a GDP or income-type VAT. Id. at 5-7.
33
Id. at 5-7; see also Gilbert Metcalf, ‘‘The Role of a ValueAdded Tax in Fundamental Tax Reform,’’ in Frontiers of Tax
Reform, 97 (1996) (noting that value added includes the value of
labor and the return to capital, and thus both would be included
in the tax base).
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on this structure by modifying the treatment of wages,
but they retain the characteristic that the tax would be
computed annually by sellers and wage earners and
would be collected annually from enterprises at each
stage of production. Thus, a subtraction VAT must be
computed and audited manually to ensure compliance,
because there would be no automatic, authoritative compilation of the sales and purchases on which the taxing
authorities could rely. Further, because sales and purchases do not involve the flow of tax funds collected at
the time of sale, there would be no electronic trail left by
the flow of funds. As such, a subtraction VAT would rely
on taxpayer self-reporting.
These characteristics — annual collection, a manual
and time-consuming audit process, and reliance on selfreporting by taxpayers — are failings shared with the
current income tax. These failings have been controlled
somewhat under the current income tax law by government withholding of tax on wages and some other types
of individual income and by reporting requirements on
Form W-2 for wages and Form 1099 for other types of
income. That compliance solution, however, is far from
complete. For example, transactions whose tax consequences depend on basis, such as sales of property,
remain unverified absent an IRS audit. Further, the
reporting requirements generally do not extend to payments made to corporations until after December 31,
2011.

C. E-VAT at the Individual Level: Wages
The treatment of individual wage earners under the
wage component of e-VAT would seem simple to the
individual. Individuals would receive the familiar Form
W-2 from their employer showing as wages the cash
amount that they received plus a ‘‘withheld’’ amount.
This withheld amount would serve as a prepayment of
the tax shown on their simple tax return. No interest,
dividends, gains, or even found money would have to be
reported on the simple tax return, nor would any deductions. As discussed earlier, progressivity and any desired
personalizing of the tax would be introduced at the wage
earner level, just as it would be under the flat tax and
X-Tax proposals, by choosing to allow personal exemptions for the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse, and children as well as deductions. Progressivity and
personalizing would also be introduced at the wage
earner level by applying a tax rate structure starting with
a zero bracket amount followed by graduated rates.
What is going on behind the scenes, however, is
something more complex and quite clever because it
accomplishes user simplicity. Recall that at the business
level, the seller collects the VAT on the full price of the
product or service sold. Yet the portion of the VAT
collected and attributable to wages will be available to
the employee as taxes paid on his behalf, similar to
withholding.
One way to understand the internal workings of the
system is to envision a structure in which wages are
subject to a VAT. A business paying wages would be
entitled to a credit for the VAT on those wages against the
VAT collected on sale of its products. However, no
separate VAT payment has to be made for wages, because
the VAT on those wages would have already been
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expenses are generally accepted on faith by the IRS and
without verification unless the IRS undertakes an audit
of the taxpayer.
One might contend that this same system could be
used if a retail sales tax were adopted in lieu of a VAT.
The essential difference between a VAT and a retail sales
tax, in terms of collection mechanics, is that under a retail
sales tax the automatic payment method described above
for the retail sale would be the end of the process. In
other words, tax would be collected only on the final
retail sale, not on the sale of intermediate goods, as
would be the case under a VAT. In contrast, under a VAT,
the seller would need to receive a credit separately for the
VAT that it paid to its suppliers of raw materials. As
discussed above, the credit process under a VAT would
involve an additional step to complete the tax collection
process.
Nevertheless, the e-VAT proposal chooses the VAT
over a retail sales tax. Taxing the intermediate transactions under a VAT would reduce the risks of evasion,
because the failure to collect the tax at the point of the
retail sale would result in forfeiture of the seller’s credit
for any tax paid on the purchase and therefore would
involve a smaller loss of revenue than would occur under
a retail sales tax.31 It would also avoid the potential tax
evasion that could result from a buyer mischaracterizing
a purchase as a business purchase, on which no retail
sales tax is due, instead of as a consumption purchase.
Under a VAT, the purchaser would be required to make
that mischaracterization to the government when it
claims its credit. Thus, while the falsification under a
retail sales tax would be one of nonreporting of the sale,
the falsification under a VAT would involve an affirmative mischaracterization of an amount already reported
to the government. This would arguably make the mischaracterization claim easier for the government to review and verify under e-VAT. Moreover, a VAT-based
system allows for progressivity as described below.
E-VAT is an improvement over the flat tax because a
credit VAT is superior to a subtraction VAT. The problem
with a subtraction VAT is that it requires annual computation and collection. Under a pure subtraction VAT, the
tax due at each stage is computed annually by multiplying the VAT rate by the excess of the taxpayer’s gross
receipts over its deductible expenditures for the year. The
cost of raw materials and capital are deductible in
computing value added,32 but the cost of labor and
returns on capital are not.33 The flat tax and X-Tax build
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Nevertheless, from the employer’s point of view, the
VAT paid by the employer on the sale of products that is
attributable to its payroll costs would be treated as the
VAT paid by the business on wages paid to its employees.
Thus, the taxes paid by the business firm on an amount of
sales equal to an employees’ wages would become the
VAT paid on behalf of that employee and would be
credited to the employee’s wage withholding account
with the federal government. Employees would therefore
be taxed on the full amount of their wages, and the
amount of those wages (including the VAT amount
attributable to the wages) could be viewed as the employee’s wages subject to the wage tax.
Another way to understand the internal workings of
the system is to view the wage component of the structure as if there were tax withholding on wages, as
explained below. Under e-VAT, employees are taxed on
their wage income, including the withheld amounts. This
latter computation of including the withheld amount as a
component of the employee’s wages is sometimes referred to as ‘‘grossing up’’ the wage amount for withheld
taxes.
Under either of these two descriptions of the inner
workings of the system, the resulting wage amount
would be used to compute the wage tax. This wage tax
could be computed at either a flat rate or a graduated set
of rates, and with or without a zero rate amount, exemptions, and deductions. The withheld amount would be
available to offset the employee’s tax.
In short, under both ways of understanding the system, the VAT collected from the employer attributable to
the employee’s wages would be available as a refundable
credit against the employee’s wage tax liability. In theory,
the VAT collected on wages would serve as an advance
collection of the employee’s tax on wage income. Under
a system of electronic payments, the VAT amount on
wages would be credited, automatically and electronically, to a tax payment from the employee on wages
through a tax credit account for the individual employee.
If the VAT charged to the employer on the wage portion
of its product were equal to the wage tax assessed on the
employee, no additional payments would be required. If
the VAT charged to the employer on the wage portion of
its product exceeded the employees’ wage tax liability,
the employee would be entitled to a refund. If the wage
tax liability exceeded the VAT, additional tax would be
due from the employee.
Returning to our earlier example, suppose an employee, Winifred, was employed by Manny and earned
$10 for her employee services. Assume a tax-inclusive
VAT of 20 percent and a wage tax at that same tax-
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inclusive rate.34 Recall that Manny had sold shoes to
retailer Roy for $70, on which he paid VAT of $14 ($70 x
20 percent). When Manny’s firm — which has collected
$70 from Roy — pays wages to Winifred in the amount of
$8, that $8 wage amount, plus the $2 VAT on that amount,
would be taxable to Winifred. The amount of $10 would
appear as wages on Winifred’s Form W-2. Winifred,
however, would be entitled to a refundable credit equal
to the $2 VAT that had been paid by her employer,
Manny, on her wages. Conceptually, this amount can be
viewed as the amount collected by Manny from its
customer, Roy, on that $10 grossed-up wage amount.
That $2 amount represents the VAT on the portion of
Manny’s $70 sale price attributable to Winifred’s wages.
Thus, if Winifred’s wage tax — computed by subtracting
from wages the applicable zero rate amount, personal
exemptions, and personalized deductions — were less
than $2, no additional tax would be due, and depending
on the rate structure, some of the tax credit could be
refunded to Winifred. In contrast, if Winifred’s wage
income were high and the applicable tax rate on that
income exceeded 20 percent, Winifred would still have
additional tax liability after taking into account the $2
credit. (It should be noted that Winifred’s wage tax could
be computed with or without a gross-up of the $2; the
choice would simply reflect the desired effective rate of
the wage tax component.35) In this manner, by engrafting
a wage tax onto the VAT, the tax system could be
personalized for wage earners, even though substantially
all of the tax due would have been collected at the point
of sale via a credit VAT.
This system could also be implemented statutorily in a
slightly different way. The wage earner’s tax could be
enacted as a yield exemption consumption tax in which
wages — but not investment income — are taxed. The tax
on wages would be subject to employer withholding. The
employer, in turn, could be allowed a VAT credit for
wage taxes withheld. This system would function mechanically, however, in the same manner for the employer as the payment of a VAT on wages. The wage
withholding on the personal services income of an employee would generate a credit to the employer, but an
equivalent amount would be subtracted from the employee’s wages and automatically paid to the government. If the employee were then taxed on a base
measured by wages in a manner similar to a personalized
yield exemption consumption tax — with a zero-rate
amount, graduated rates, personal exemptions, and deductions — the withholding on the employee’s wages
would serve as an offset to the employee’s wage income
tax. This amount could be refunded for a low-wage
employee (which would be determined by an aggregate
of all of the employee’s wages earned during the year).
High-wage employees would have to pay additional tax
if their tax liability were greater than their withheld
amount.

34
See Appendix A (demonstrating the equivalence of a 20
percent tax-inclusive rate and a 25 percent tax-exclusive rate).
35
See Appendix A (describing ‘‘gross-up’’).
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remitted to the taxing authority when the products were
sold by the employer. The employer’s VAT credit and the
employee’s VAT payment would offset each other as far
as the taxing authority was concerned. By not permitting
the employer to take an actual credit on the VAT paid for
employees, the VAT attributable to the wages paid would
remain with the taxing authority.
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For a discussion of the difference between economic incidence and legal incidence, see Section I of this report.
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would highlight the real costs to the government of those
tax expenditures. That would be true because those tax
expenditures would be the only source to generate a tax
refund to the wage earner.

D. Progressivity
It is desirable from an administrative point of view to
set the business tax at a rate not less than the highest
individual tax rate. This decision derives from the fact
that the risk of manipulation by taxpayers in optimizing
their tax rates lies in the area of small proprietor-owned
businesses, often referred to as closely held businesses. In
these businesses, owner-operators often can choose to
extract earnings from the business through salaries or
through distribution of profits. Left to their own unchecked devices, these taxpayers would choose the most
‘‘tax efficient’’ method — that is, the method that would
result in the lowest tax. If the individual wage tax rate
were to exceed the business tax rate, one would expect
the owner-operator to seek to take funds as a distribution
of profits, resulting in those distribution amounts being
subjected to only the business tax rate. The owneroperator could also leave the cash in the business for
future distribution, thereby using the business as a tax
haven.
For example, if the individual wage tax rate were 34
percent and the business tax rate were 28 percent, a
business owner-operator would get a tax advantage by
taking a small wage (contending that his work was minor
in the enterprise), avoiding a 34 percent tax in lieu of
having his business subject to a 28 percent tax.
In contrast, if the business tax rate exceeded the
individual’s wage tax rate, owner-operators would seek
to extract the funds as wages. For example, if the business
tax rate were 34 percent and exceeded the top individual
wage tax rate of 28 percent, owner-operators would have
an incentive to make all payments from the business as
wage payments to themselves, rather than as distributions. However, if the two rates were equal, owneroperators would be indifferent with regard to how the
money was paid to them.
Establishing the appropriate amount of compensation
in the situations in which the individual and business tax
rates differ could be administratively burdensome and
expensive, making the tax likely to generate controversy.
One way out of this dilemma is to recognize that the top
individual wage tax rate should equal the business tax
rate, thereby avoiding the manipulation described above.
Establishing a single rate of tax for both wage earners and
businesses would avoid the issue entirely. However,
pursuing this option could be inconsistent with the
political necessity of progressivity.
Regardless of political demands, progressivity at the
top rates should be discouraged. An optimal rate structure would be achieved by setting the top wage tax rate
and the business tax rate at the same level. Moreover,
these top rates should be tied together in structure so that
they could be increased or decreased in later years only
simultaneously, not individually or separately. This solution still leaves open the opportunity for manipulation at
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Both methods of implementing the wage component
of e-VAT, described above, would be economically
equivalent if the VAT rate and wage tax rate were the
same. They would differ only in the technical description
and legal incidence36 of the tax on wage earnings. In the
first system, the legal incidence of the tax is on the
employer, and the tax paid by the employer is available,
computationally, as a refundable credit to the employee.
In the second system, the legal incidence of the tax is on
the employee, but the tax is satisfied on behalf of the
employee automatically through withholding by the employer. Importantly, however, regardless of the method
used to characterize the system, the process will be the
same for the wage earner and will remain simple for
individuals.
If the wage tax rate exceeded the credit VAT rate, the
conceptualization of these methods would differ. Any
excess would more properly be characterized as a yield
exemption consumption tax or loosely as a wage income
tax. In combination, these taxes comprise a consumption
tax system that can be progressive by incorporating a
yield exemption component and thereby imposing the
legal incidence for a portion of the tax on wage earners.
Importantly, combining a wage-type tax with a credit
VAT allows e-VAT to incorporate important components
of the existing income tax, such as the earned income tax
credit, and to coexist easily with existing payroll taxes.
For example, the refundable credits for employees would
serve as a substitute for the current EITC, although in a
substantially simplified form. Low-wage earners would,
in effect, receive a wage subsidy, which would be computed annually but could be converted to periodic payments in the same manner as under the current EITC.
Also, the wage component of e-VAT allows the tax
system to maintain its current funding mechanisms for
Social Security and Medicare, which are payroll-based,
because wages would still need to be tracked and reported under e-VAT. Retaining Social Security and Medicare as wage-based might or might not be desirable in the
long run (this issue is beyond the scope of this report).
Regardless, when large structural changes are made to
the government’s principal revenue source, it is highly
desirable to leave other tax processes intact.
Finally, if the wage component of e-VAT could be kept
free of tax expenditure deductions such as home mortgage interest, the system could be made return-free. The
wage earner would simply submit a Form W-4 to his
employer and the government, listing his dependents,
and the employer could compute the exact amount of the
wage tax. If that tax exceeded the VAT attributable to the
wages, the employer could withhold an additional
amount. If the tax were less than the VAT attributable to
wages, the employer could advance an additional
amount to the employee, and the employer could reduce
its VAT payment to the government by taking a credit for
the additional advance payment to the employee.
Interestingly, such a system, if it also contained tax
expenditure deductions for individual wage earners,
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E. E-VAT Puts the Estate Tax in Its Rightful Place
E-VAT facilitates an estate tax that is free from the
complaint of the estate tax’s current critics — that it
represents a second tax on saved income and is therefore
unfair. Under e-VAT, the estate tax would be the only
time when saved income would be taxed.
The estate tax rate would be set at the same rate as the
business e-VAT tax rate. Also, a gift tax at that rate would
be retained to backstop the estate tax, as it does under the
current system. Gift and estate taxes at the same rate as
e-VAT would fit consistently with the conceptual underpinnings of e-VAT as a consumption tax. E-VAT would
represent a consumption tax during life, taxing consumed wealth, while the estate tax would tax unconsumed wealth at death. As such, e-VAT and the estate tax,
along with the gift tax, would form an integrated tax
system grounded on consistent principles. Use of the
standard e-VAT rate for the estate and gift taxes would
facilitate collection on wealth transfers at death and
during life. Linkage of these tax rates would also reinforce the conceptual unity of the e-VAT system.
In this manner, the estate and gift taxes would perform
their original functions of retarding the accumulations of
dynastic family wealth.37 The estate and gift taxes would
contain exemptions, exclusions, and other rules that are
similar to the current versions38 but presumably less
porous and more inclusive. For instance, the minimum
size of a taxable estate would be significantly less than $7

37

See Anne L. Astott, ‘‘Equal Opportunity and Inheritance
Taxation,’’ 121 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 470-471 (2007); cf. Louis
Eisenstein, ‘‘The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax,’’ 11 Tax L.
Rev. 223, 226-227 (1956) (arguing that the federal estate tax was
originally intended as a revenue source and that the ‘‘movement
[that] identified death duties with the social control of hereditary wealth’’ occurred at the end of the 19th century).
38
The relevant provisions of the estate and gift taxes are
contained in sections 2010-2015, 2051, and 2053-2058.
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million for a married couple and $3.5 million for a single
individual, the beginning points under the current discussion.39
Taxation of amounts saved and not consumed under
e-VAT would, by virtue of the estate tax, simply be
delayed. This feature should blunt the charge by income
tax advocates that e-VAT is regressive, and the charge by
estate tax opponents that the estate tax is a death tax on
wealth that has already been taxed.

F. E-VAT Corrects the Flaws of the Income Tax
E-VAT avoids most of the failings of the current
income tax and improves the process with regard to
failings that are inherent in any tax system and thus
cannot be entirely avoided.
1. Uncertain tax base of the income tax. The tax base,
which is uncertain under the income tax, would be
substantially more certain under e-VAT. Under e-VAT, the
law would not have to draw a distinction between a
capital expenditure and an ordinary, current deduction.
Rather, all business expenditures would give rise to a
VAT credit. Thus, the distinction between ordinary deductions and capitalization, which is so troublesome
under the current income tax, would be irrelevant under
e-VAT. At the business level, all expenditures for business, both ordinary expenses and purchases of property
other than financial assets like stocks and bonds, would
be subject to a VAT and would be allowed a full VAT
credit in the year they were incurred. This feature would
eliminate judgment calls about the length of time over
which the expenditure would be depreciated and the
need to audit those judgment calls.
Moreover, these distinctions would also disappear at
the individual wage earner level under e-VAT. Appreciation of investment assets, whether realized or unrealized,
would not be subject to tax at the nonbusiness level
because the tax at that level would be a wage tax. Thus,
the problem of the realization requirement under the
income tax would become a nonissue under e-VAT.
Increases in the value of investment property, whether
realized or unrealized, would not be subject to tax unless
spent on consumption. No tax on investment income
would be collected under the wage earner part of e-VAT.
Rather, the tax would be collected at the business level as
a VAT, so the wage earner would not experience the
payment of the tax by making a payment to the IRS.
Instead, the wage earner would pay the tax as part of the
price of the goods or services purchased for consumption.
The business-personal distinction, which is troublesome under the income tax, is unavoidable under both
tax systems. Under e-VAT, one must still determine
whether the VAT paid for the good or service is permitted
to be used as a VAT credit by the purchaser. If the
expenditure was business, a credit would be allowed. If
the expenditure was personal, a credit would not be
allowed. The determination of whether the item is business or personal would present the same issues under

39
See section 2010 (describing the available credit against the
estate tax).
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lower wage tax rate levels, but the amounts likely involved would be relatively small because the problem
would largely involve low-earning businesses or children
of the owner-operators.
In theory, the administrative problems described
above are present in the current income tax and Social
Security tax systems. For example, S corporation owners
often seek to avoid payroll tax by taking ‘‘distributions’’
instead of wages. Yet a body of case law as well as
administrative rules have developed to seek to deal with
this problem. Conversely, owner-operators throughout
history have sought to avoid the corporate level tax by
paying distributions disguised as wages. A body of law
has also developed here, limiting corporations’ deduction for wages to only the amount that is ‘‘reasonable’’ for
the services actually performed.
As explained above, both potentially troublesome
issues could be avoided by a uniform tax rate applicable
to both businesses and wage earners. If a progressive
system is to be achieved, however, some damage must be
accepted to the simplicity of the system. The damage can
be minimized by equating the business tax rate to the top
wage tax rate.
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G. An Easy Tax, But at What Rate?
Die-hard defenders of the income tax will likely argue
that the tax rate required of a consumption tax, such as

40

See Section III, infra, of this report.
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e-VAT, will be so high as to dissuade adoption. Moreover,
they will likely claim that the burden will fall entirely on
labor.
The authors of The FairTax Book, as well as an academic
advocate for this tax, Prof. Laurence J. Kotlikoff, estimate
that a tax rate of 23 percent for a consumption tax in the
form of a national sales tax would be sufficient to collect
the amount of tax now collected by the income tax,
payroll taxes, estate taxes, and gift taxes, and to provide
a rebate to each household.41 An economist and critic of
The FairTax Book, William G. Gale of the Brookings
Institution and the Tax Policy Center, disputes this low
figure and instead estimates the rate to be around 39
percent.42 These are both tax-exclusive rates.43 The difference between these estimates might have to do with
whether governments — including state and local governments — would be required to pay the tax on their
purchases (the higher figure assuming not, while the
lower figure assuming they would), and whether private
education and travel would be included in the tax base.
Moreover, even using Gale’s assumptions of coverage,
Kotlikoff disputes the resulting tax rate and estimates it
to be around 23.82 percent.44
This dispute and these figures carry over to e-VAT,
because e-VAT, for these purposes, is essentially a nuanced VAT. E-VAT rates, when converted to a taxexclusive rate, are directly comparable to traditional sales
tax rates. Assuming that the business-level tax and the
wage tax were set at the same tax rate, e-VAT’s business
level VAT rates would be 30 percent under Kotlikoff’s
estimate, 65 percent under Gale’s higher estimate, and
31.27 percent under Kotlikoff’s estimate using Gale’s
coverage assumptions. These numbers would be somewhat higher under e-VAT because of its graduated wage
tax component for low-wage workers. Beyond these
estimates, I have no better estimate of the expected rate.
These two economists are well respected. Moreover, I
think that the actual rate is a red herring in the tax reform
discussion.
If we assume that the tax sought to be collected and
retained by the government under a substitute tax should
be the same as under the current income tax (and other
taxes), e-VAT is clearly superior to the income tax. That is
because it saves the deadweight cost of the current
income tax and will substantially reduce cheating and

41
See Laurence J. Kotlikoff, ‘‘Saving and Consumption Taxation: The Federal Retail Sales Tax Example,’’ in Frontiers of Tax
Reform, supra note 33, at 160, 170.
42
William G. Gale, ‘‘The National Retail Sales Tax: What
Would the Rate Have to Be?’’ Tax Notes, May 16, 2005, p. 889
(arguing that the tax-inclusive rate would need to be 31 percent,
and that if the rate was set at 23 percent tax-inclusive, revenue
loss would exceed $7 trillion over the next 10 years). See also
Gale, ‘‘The Required Tax Rate in a National Retail Sales Tax,’’ 52
National Tax J. 443 (1999).
43
See Appendix A.
44
Paul Bachman, Jonathan Haughton, Laurence J. Kotlikoff,
Alfonso Sanchez-Penalver, and David G. Tuerck, ‘‘Taxing Sales
Under the Fair Tax: What Rate Works?’’ Tax Notes, Nov. 13, 2006,
p. 663, Doc 2006-21659, 2006 TNT 219-51 (responding to Gale’s
analysis and arguing that 23 percent is ‘‘eminently feasible’’).

1363

(C) Tax Analysts 2010. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

both tax systems. Indeed, those issues would be the same
regardless of the form of income tax or consumption tax
chosen. What is different under e-VAT is that each
transaction for which a determination must be made is
reported separately and electronically, allowing for easier
identification by auditors and more robust verification by
the taxing authorities. E-VAT also would enable disallowance of a VAT credit on some expenses deemed inherently personal.40
2. The flawed and outmoded design of the income tax.
The flawed and outmoded design of the income tax’s tax
assessment and collection process makes compliance and
planning under the income tax expensive. Also, those
features make the administration of the income tax
expensive as well. In contrast, e-VAT offers a clean and
automatic system of tax assessment and collection.
Compliance would be largely electronic under e-VAT.
IRS oversight would be easier and more complete, because the transparency of the taxing process and the
availability of computer recordkeeping and verification
would allow VAT payments and credits to be tracked
electronically. As a result, e-VAT is substantially simpler
and less susceptible to cheating than an income tax.
Accordingly, one would expect the tax gap caused by tax
cheating under the current system to be substantially
reduced if not virtually eliminated. This would result in
a direct and important reduction in tax for honest taxpaying individuals and businesses.
At the individual level, e-VAT permits the use of a
much simplified tax return. To the extent that tax expenditures were left in the system, their effect would
become glaring.
3. No disincentive for saving and investment. E-VAT,
like other consumption taxes, contains no perverse disincentives against saving and investment. As such, it
should provide the same economic benefits that other
consumption taxes would provide. It does not, however,
allow avoidance of business-level tax through investments in financial assets like stocks and bonds. This is
because no VAT is charged on the purchase of investment
assets, so no VAT credit would be permissible to offset
VAT owed by the business taxpayer.
4. Removes the current tax bias toward leverage. E-VAT
treats interest expense payable on debt as nondeductible
at the business tax level and thus equivalent to returns to
equity. As a result, e-VAT corrects the destabilizing bias of
the current income tax toward debt financing over equity
financing.
5. No great distributional effect on the tax burden.
Finally, e-VAT is progressive. It therefore does not have
the same tax distributional effects as a VAT or retail sales
tax. Further, it ultimately collects tax on a taxpayer’s
accumulated income when combined with nonporous
estate and gift taxes, but unlike the current system, it
collects that tax only once.
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III. Special Considerations
E-VAT, described in the previous section, looks like a
system that is efficient, fair, and relatively leakproof, and
that creates the appropriate incentives for taxpayers. At
this point, you may be wondering ‘‘wait, are we missing
something?’’ This section will anticipate objections to
e-VAT that income tax apologists are likely to make. It
will also discuss some special situations and explain how
e-VAT would deal with these situations. This discussion
should demonstrate the adaptability and durability of
e-VAT and its superiority over the income tax.

A. Anonymity
It is anticipated that most retail transactions would be
undertaken with either a credit card or a debit card. In
some cases, however, a customer may desire a more
depersonalized method of payment. For example, a taxpayer may want confidentiality regarding his purchases.
This confidentiality could be achieved by allowing the
customer to purchase a stored-value card, which operates
like a debit card and automatically accesses a specific
account at a financial institution but is not necessarily
associated with the individual possessor of the card. All
of the major credit card companies now issue storedvalue cards.
Alternatively, a customer could purchase a cash card.
Cash cards could be printed with magnetic strips similar
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See Goldberg, supra note 23.
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to the Metro fare cards in Washington.46 which have
amounts encoded on their magnetic strips but do not
access a central account. They would not store much
value and will tend to be dedicated to prepaid services
(for example, metro systems and parking meters) and as
such could be used for small incidental and prepaid
purchases. Both the Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority in greater Washington and its surrounding suburbs and the Metropolitan Transit Authority in New York as well as several other mass transit
systems now use cash cards.
Stored-value cards could be treated in one of two
ways. They could simply be used as a mechanism of
transferring pocket money by an individual. When used,
the cards would be treated as a debit card, with VAT
collected at the time of use. Alternatively, stored-value
cards could be subject to a VAT when purchased. For
example, assuming again a VAT rate of 20 percent, a
customer could purchase a stored-value card with $80
value by having $100 debited from his account, which
would result in only $80 of stored value being placed on
the card. Under this approach, customers would have
only the actual cost of each purchase, without any VAT
amount, subtracted from the balance on their cards.
Merchants would keep the entire proceeds from the sales
made with these cards, because the government would
have already received its VAT when the customer purchased the stored-value card. The first approach would
be more consistent with the e-VAT mechanics as a whole,
although the second method may better assure tax collection. Neither works well for nonretail purchasers who
desire anonymity and who expect to use the VAT paid as
a credit against VAT owed on their sales. Thus, if such a
purchaser of intermediate goods or services desires anonymity, he may have to forgo the available VAT credit.
However, this conundrum faced by purchasers is no
different than under the income tax, which requires that
they establish their deductions or cost of equipment or
inventory.
Cash cards raise similar issues, but of lesser magnitude because they likely will store less money and
represent a prepayment for services yet to be rendered.
As such, it would seem administratively easier to view
the purchase of one of these cards as itself a retail
purchase subject to e-VAT at the time of purchase.
To mitigate the risks of easy tax avoidance so that
taxpayers can enjoy the speed and convenience of storedvalue and cash cards, it will be necessary to ensure that

46
For example, in Washington Metro riders purchase debit
SmarTrip or fare cards and put a given amount of cash on the
card. The rider flashes the SmarTrip card or inserts the fare card
to enter the station, and then reinserts the card to exit. The
amount debited is based on the distance traveled and the time
of day traveled; for instance, it is more expensive to travel
during rush hour than on the weekends. The difference between
the cards lies in the central repository nature of the SmarTrip
card, which allows it to keep track of any remaining value on
the user’s account, whereas the fare card uses only a magnetic
strip on the card to keep track of its value. See generally
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, SmarTrip,
available at http://www.wmata.com/fares/smartrip/.
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thereby close the tax gap. The savings from fewer government tax administrators, if passed back to the taxpayers in the form of lower rates, as well as from fewer
private sector tax compliance professionals and tax planners, should leave the taxpayers as a group with significantly less overall tax and other tax-related expenses than
under the current income tax. This should be the case
regardless of the macroeconomic consequences.
And there will likely be positive macroeconomic consequences. E-VAT’s decision to tax only consumption and
not savings or investment should allow the economy to
accumulate domestic capital, become more capital intensive and efficient, and grow as a result.
Will these cost-saving and macroeconomic benefits be
sufficient to convince die-hard income tax defenders of
the wisdom of adopting e-VAT? The die-hards likely will
contend that relieving capital from a share of the tax
burden will unduly shift the burden entirely to labor, and
that shift alone will require higher tax rates than would
exist under a broad-based income tax. My response to
those claims is that the current income tax is not actually
a broad-based income tax now45 and that the relief of
capital that is not now eligible for the preferred treatment
under the current tax system will be far outweighed by
the benefits from e-VAT that were discussed in this
section. This proposition can neither be proven nor
disproven. Most economists who have considered and
written on the subject of consumption taxes, however,
believe this proposition to be true for consumption taxes
in general, even without the additional cost and tax gap
savings that will result from e-VAT.
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B. Cash Transactions
The e-VAT system is also adaptable to an economy in
which some transactions still take place using cash. Cash
transactions, of course, would be subject to e-VAT and the
VAT should be collected at the time of sale. The issue here
is one of ensuring compliance, because cash transactions
do not give rise to electronic trails unless the merchant
causes an electronic trail to be generated. In those transactions, merchants would be required to record the
transaction in the same manner as a debit or a credit card
transaction, but they would direct the payment of the tax
to the taxing authority electronically from their own
funds. The merchant would have already collected from
the customer a sufficient amount of cash to pay the tax.
This payment of tax could occur automatically through
the merchant electronically reporting the sale as a cash
transaction or with the delay of a few days to allow the
merchant to deposit the cash. Tax collection on cash
transactions, nevertheless, would be heavily dependent
on compliance by merchants.
A further complication could arise because some merchants might run their businesses entirely with cash or
checks, not using any electronic transaction methods,
such as credit cards or other EFT modes. Collection of tax
from those merchants would require paper reporting and
auditing, which could result in compliance problems.
However, as cash payments become replaced in the
economy by electronic methods,48 any compliance issues
would decline. Moreover, to the extent that there is a
compliance problem, it would likely be limited to smallbusiness retailers, such as mom-and-pop-owned clothing
stores and grocery stores. Larger retailers such as department stores make their sales through employees using
carefully monitored electronic registers, and therefore,
for their own purposes, need to ensure that all sales —

47
Currently, a PIN is used. However, one can imagine that a
thumbprint or a retinal image could be substituted as soon as
technology permits it. See, e.g., Randall W. Sifers, ‘‘Regulating
Electronic Money in Small-Value Payment Systems: Telecommunications Law as a Regulatory Model,’’ 49 Fed. Comm. L.J.
701, 714, 724-725 (1997) (describing security measures for smart
cards).
48
See generally Daniel D. Garcia Swartz et al., ‘‘The Economics
of a Cashless Society: An Analysis of the Costs and Benefits of
Payment Instruments,’’ AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Related Publication No. 04-24 (2004).
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particularly cash sales — get properly recorded. Thus,
even though the retail layer of the VAT might be at risk
with regard to small retailers, the VAT would likely be
reliably collected by large retailers and sellers of intermediate goods, such as business suppliers. As a result,
the tax gap would likely be limited to a portion of the
aggregate retail level markup. Revenue auditors, freed
from the more burdensome income tax, should be able to
ensure reasonable compliance.

C. Policing Inherently Personal Expenses
Even under e-VAT, as would be the case with any
consumption tax, a distinction must be made between
business expenses and personal consumption expenses.
Under e-VAT, like a traditional credit method VAT, the
place in the taxation process at which this distinction
needs to be drawn and confronted is the VAT credit. The
credit for VAT paid is claimed by a business taxpayer for
business purchases of new materials, equipment, inventory, and regular business expenses. The credit for VAT
paid becomes available to offset the VAT collected and
remitted to the taxing authority on the business taxpayer’s sale of its product or service. In contrast, no VAT
credit would be allowed for VAT paid on personal
consumption expenditures. (Under e-VAT’s wage tax
component, no credit would be allowed for the VAT paid
for unreimbursed employee business expenses.49)
The personal-business linedrawing that plagues the
current income tax can be more easily handled under
e-VAT. Under the current income tax, some kinds of
expenditures, such as meals and entertainment expenses,
must be characterized by taxpayers as either business
(and therefore deductible within the applicable percentage limitation) or as personal (and therefore nondeductible). This characterization occurs on the business
taxpayer’s tax return and thus determines the taxpayer’s
tax owed (assuming there is no IRS challenge on audit, a
process that is far from comprehensive).
E-VAT handles these issues much more transparently.
First, this line-drawing question arises only at the business level under e-VAT, because the wage tax portion of
e-VAT would not allow these types of deductions. Second, VAT credits for purchases for which they are
claimed could be sorted and separately stated for easy
identification by auditors, because all VAT-producing
transactions are tracked electronically, using identifying
numbers of both the purchaser, who will get the credit for
VAT paid, and the seller, who will remit the VAT collected
to the government. Third, in areas known to be subject to
large abuses, blanket rules could be created to flag
offending expenses. For example, meals and entertainment expenses could be specifically excluded from eligibility for a VAT credit. VATs paid to restaurants and to
sporting event ticket vendors would thus be ignored

49
This result is similar to the essentially nondeductible
treatment of unreimbursed employee business expenses under
the current income tax because of their treatment as miscellaneous itemized deductions, which subjects them to the limitations of deductibility only to the extent that they exceed 2
percent of adjusted gross income. Section 67(b).
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the cards cannot become a medium of exchange. This
could be accomplished by personalizing the cards, so that
the cards could be used by only the original purchaser,
and by preventing transfer of the value embedded in one
card to cards not owned by the original purchaser.
To prevent stored-value cards from being used as a
substitute for currency and thereby to avoid the VAT at
the retail level under e-VAT, a card holder’s personal
identification attribute47 (for example, a PIN, which is
standard for debit cards under current technology, or a
thumbprint or retinal image, which likely will be better
supported by future technology) would be required to
transfer funds from any unnamed account accessed by
the card.
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credits for these items would make detection under
e-VAT easy and could allow for lower tax rates on the
broader base than would otherwise be possible.
A similar approach of nondeductibility could be
adopted under the current income tax, as has been done
in other developed countries, such as the United Kingdom. As of yet, however, Congress has not chosen to do
that. Instead, it has, over a span of more than 40 years,
enacted and amended various complicated special limitations, leaving what most people would see as clear
abuses largely untouched. The most significant limitation
was enacted in 1986 — and amended in 1988 — to limit
most food and entertainment expense deductions to 50
percent of the amount expended. This limitation has
reduced abuse but increased the complexity of the income tax system. In contrast, e-VAT, as a new system,
could simply disallow a VAT credit for these personal
expenses, an action that would thereby eliminate the
abuse.

D. Control of Systemic Tax Cheating
VAT proponents contend that a credit VAT in the
United States would be more secure than alternative
forms of taxation, like the income tax, because a credit
VAT, like e-VAT, is not nearly as susceptible to cheating.
Income tax proponents disagree and respond with the
‘‘conventional wisdom’’ that the British experience with
the VAT leaks about 15 percent of its tax revenue because
of cheating,50 a figure that is roughly equivalent to the
estimated tax cheating losses for the U.S. income tax.51
Does this apparent equivalence mean that e-VAT will
neither improve the level of tax compliance nor reduce
the tax gap? I do not think so.
First, the most obvious form of VAT cheating involves
the fictitious payee. A taxpayer concocts a fictitious
purchase and related VAT payment made to a nonexistent seller and claims a VAT credit for the VAT that was
never actually paid. Electronic tracing under e-VAT
largely eliminates this problem. If there is no reported
sale, there is no reported purchase in the database. If the
taxpayer claims that the purchase was made in cash, it
will easily be identifiable by the taxing authority and will
be ripe for audit and disallowance.
Second, much of the VAT cheating in Britain and other
parts of the EU traces to two aspects of the European VAT
that either would not apply in the U.S. economy or

50
See HM Revenue & Customs, ‘‘Measuring Tax Gaps 2009,’’
at 11 (2009), available at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/freedom/taxgap-estimates.htm (describing the tax gap in the United Kingdom as ranging between 11.8 percent and 15.7 percent of VAT
revenue between 2002 and 2009); see also Reckon, LLP, ‘‘Study to
Quantify and Analyse the VAT Gap in the EU — 25 Member
States,’’ Sept. 21, 2009, at 46, available at http://ec.europa.eu/
taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/tax_coopera
tion/combating_tax_fraud/reckon_report_sep2009.pdf
(reporting the results of a study commissioned by the European
Commission that estimated the VAT gap in the United Kingdom
to be 17 percent in 2006).
51
See Joel Slemrod, ‘‘Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of
Tax Evasion,’’ 21 J. Econ. Persp. 25, 31, 33 (2007) (estimating that
noncompliance with the U.S. income tax is about 17 percent of
actual revenue).
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automatically when determining a taxpayer’s VAT credits. Alternatively, if a partial VAT credit were to be
allowed for these expenses, the VAT credit could be
partially allowed and the expenses could be made readily
identifiable.
In theory, e-VAT could adopt the same disallowance of
personal expense rules that now exist under the income
tax. Even if those rules were adopted, taxpayer compliance with the rules should increase dramatically under
e-VAT, because of the automatic tracking built into this
system. Thus, under e-VAT, the taxing authority could
more easily identify personal expenses, like a vacation
trip to Paris purchased by a taxpayer for which he
claimed a VAT credit, because each expense would
appear as a separate item in the taxing authority’s
database. As such, taxpayers could not exaggerate the
amount of the VAT paid for personal expenses, like this
trip to Paris. Although whether the trip had a business
connection would still have to be identified on audit, at
least the scope of the taxing authority’s inquiry would be
significantly narrowed.
It is also likely that taxpayers would be much more
reluctant to cheat because of the greater ease with which
the taxing authority could establish both error and intention on the part of a taxpayer erroneously claiming a VAT
credit. For example, the taxing authority could easily
identify all taxpayer credits claimed for club dues (for
which no income tax deduction is currently allowed),
because the identification number of the club, which
would be the seller in the transaction, would attach to the
transaction giving rise to the VAT credit in question.
Some personal expenditures would remain difficult to
police. Suppose that special clothing expenses are paid
for by a business for its employee, which the business
regards as a business expense rather than compensation
to the employee. Under the income tax, policing of that
expense involves examining it among a list of many other
items claimed by the employer as business expenses.
Under e-VAT, the credit for the VAT paid on the clothing
would involve examining VAT credits that could be
coded for clothing (and other items identified as areas
involving potential abuse). Precoding of VATs by type of
expenditure should make an auditor’s job substantially
easier than under the income tax. Issues like these may
still need to be examined on audit, and just as under any
other consumption or income tax system, discovery
would still require a vigilant taxing authority to audit the
taxpayer. Nevertheless, the audit process would likely be
more efficient under e-VAT because the taxing authority
would have available a database under an electronically
collected VAT.
Adoption of e-VAT may present an opportune time to
bring new order to the personal-business distinction.
Adoption of this system may be a good time to codify
objective rules for determining which expenses are
viewed as inherently personal. For example, e-VAT could
deny VAT credits for all entertainment expenses, all
commuting expenses, all clothing expenses (other than
uniforms paid for by the employer), and some other
expenses common to all working individuals. These are
the most common areas of abuse, which generally involve small amounts in individual cases but large
amounts in the aggregate. Broad rules denying VAT
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The second aspect of the European VAT that engenders cheating is that a VAT is not payable by the
merchant collecting it until many months after the transaction.52 This combination of zero-rated imports and
delayed VAT remittance has given rise to a fraudulent
technique known as the ‘‘missing trader’’ scam. Under
the scam, a buyer claims a VAT credit for a transaction in
which the seller never remitted the VAT collected.53 This
scam and its variations account for the bulk of the EU’s
VAT compliance losses.54
An example will help illustrate how the scam works.
An importer, referred to as Trader, imports goods — say,
cellphones55 — for which the exporter does not collect a
VAT, because the European VATs are destination-based.
Trader immediately resells the cellphones to Wholesaler,
who pays the price of the phones plus a VAT, let’s say in
the amount of €20. Wholesaler knows that the VAT paid
will be a credit against the VAT that he owes when he
resells the phones to Retailer. Trader, who collected the
VAT from Wholesaler, disappears, or goes missing, ergo
becomes a missing trader without ever having remitted
the VAT to the government. Wholesaler claims the VAT
credit of €20, thereby reducing his VAT liability by that
amount. Trader’s failure to remit the VAT payment,
however, is not a sine qua non for Wholesaler obtaining
a VAT credit. If Wholesaler can prove that the VAT
payment was made, Wholesaler will be entitled to the
VAT credit. The net result is that the government fails to
collect the €20 from the missing trader. The government
thus forever loses a major share of the VAT on the
imported product, because the missing trader never
makes the remittance of the VAT that it collected from

52
‘‘A Tax Net Full of Holes,’’ The Economist, May 13, 2006, at
87. (‘‘Trade data have to be passed to a trader’s national tax
authority only after three months and the taxman has another
three months to hand them on to his counterparts across the
EU.’’)
53
See Richard T. Ainsworth, ‘‘Carousel Fraud in the EU: A
Digital VAT Solution,’’ Tax Notes Int’l, May 16, 2006, p. 443, Doc
2006-7105, or 2006 WTD 86-7.
54
See Andrea Gebauer et al., ‘‘Can Reform Models of Value
Added Taxation Stop the VAT Evasion and Revenue Shortfalls
in the EU?’’ 10 J. Econ. Pol’y Reform 1 (2007).
55
This is the example used by Ainsworth that is based on an
actual case in Britain, Fresh ‘N’ Clean. See Richard T. Ainsworth,
‘‘Tackling VAT Fraud: Car Flipping and Computer Chips on a
Carousel,’’ Tax Notes Int’l, Apr. 16, 2007, p. 267, Doc 2007-8574, or
2007 WTD 76-8.
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Wholesaler. Meanwhile, Wholesaler is entitled to the
credit, thereby precluding the government from recouping the VAT from him.
The missing trader scam presents a problem for government collection regardless of whether Wholesaler is
an intentional or unwitting part of the scam. The ultimate
sale of the product carries with it the full VAT. If
Wholesaler is part of the scam, which the government
may suspect, Wholesaler will share in the absconded VAT
with the missing trader. If Wholesaler is not part of the
scam, he may still have benefited from the scam by being
able to purchase the imported cellphones in effect at a
cheaper price. Either way, Wholesaler’s profits will be
augmented by the unremitted VAT collected by the
missing trader.
There are several variations of the missing trader
scam. One is known as ‘‘the carousel.’’ In the carousel,
Wholesaler is an exporter whose sales abroad will not be
subject to the VAT, which is destination-based. Nevertheless, it can claim a credit for the VAT that it paid to
Trader, and if it has no domestic sales, a refund of the
VAT paid to Trader. The result is that Wholesaler, an
exporter, is claiming a refund of VAT that Trader has
never remitted to the government. Thus, the government
is out of pocket the amount equal to the VAT collected
from Wholesaler by Trader as a result of a transaction in
which the home country has had no more involvement
than merely being a place where the goods have come to
rest momentarily. The VAT scam simply involved shipping the goods in and out of the country, perhaps in a
single day. In the carousel, it does not matter what the
goods are, because the only effect of the transaction is to
generate a VAT credit to Wholesaler, which is refunded
by the government.
However, the carousel comes with the drawback of
requiring Wholesaler to request a refund, alerting the
government to a potential scam. To protect against this,
scammers have developed a variation of the carousel
known as ‘‘contra-trading,’’ which avoids the need for a
refund claim. Under contra-trading, an actual VATpaying business steps in as the wholesaler. It buys the
goods from Trader at a bargain price and can use the VAT
collected by Trader to offset the VAT that would otherwise need to be remitted by Wholesaler on its sales. This
thus eliminates the need for a refund request and reduces
the risk of alerting the government to the scam. This ploy
comes close to the income tax shelters involving ‘‘purchasing’’ artificially generated losses to offset income or
gain.
Importantly, these are effective scams against the
government because of the zero-rating of the imported
goods in the EU and the lack of timely collection of the
VAT from the missing trader. However, neither of these
conditions would exist under e-VAT. In particular, the
zero-rating condition would not be present in a U.S.
credit VAT system, and the timely collection condition
would not exist under e-VAT.
Sales of goods that pass between U.S. states are not
zero-rated, unlike sales of goods among EU member
countries. This is because a U.S. VAT would be a national
federal tax system. Thus, only imports (from outside the
United States) would be zero-rated. Imports into the
United States, unlike imports in the EU from other
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would be controllable with the electronically collected
method proposed for e-VAT. The first aspect is that in
Europe, VAT cheating occurs largely because the
European-style VAT is destination-based, even within the
EU. Thus, goods that move across borders within the EU
are zero-rated; that is, they are not subject to VAT on
import. Consequently, the destination country of the
import can collect the entire VAT on the product as the
product moves up the chain — from importer to wholesaler to retailer, all the way up to customer — because the
importer will not get a VAT credit for the VAT not
collected on the import transaction.
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E. International Consistency
Virtually the entire industrialized world, with the
exception of the United States, uses a credit-method VAT.
Some countries have chosen to have multiple rates for
varying products, a complicating feature requiring classification decisions for products with few differences. For
instance, in the United Kingdom, the VAT rate for cooked
chicken differs from the VAT rate for only partially
cooked chicken that can be purchased for takeout to be
fully cooked at a later time. Because administrative
efficiency is a major goal of e-VAT and requiring judgment calls in the selling process would impede that
efficiency, e-VAT uses a single VAT rate. Some VAT
systems allow an exemption from the collection process
for small businesses. Under e-VAT’s automatic and electronic collection system, no such exemption is necessary
or desirable.
Finally, most countries employing a credit VAT — 110
countries at last count — have chosen to use a
destination-based tax. Under a destination-based VAT,
the VAT is imposed on imports in their destination
country, but not on exports, which can be sold free of
VAT. An origin-based VAT, in contrast, would impose the
tax on exports but not on imports. E-VAT uses the
destination-based system as well and thus is in step with
other VAT regimes.
E-VAT’s destination-based choice would correct the
competitive price disadvantage in Europe — as well as
other VAT-collecting jurisdictions — that U.S. exports
now suffer against those VAT-collecting jurisdictions’
manufactured goods. This competitive disadvantage results from the fact that U.S. goods incur and thus absorb
and include in their prices the U.S. corporate income tax
imposed on the U.S. producers as well as the VAT owed
when the importer sells the U.S. goods in those VAT
destinations. Under destination-based e-VAT, as a replacement for the corporate tax, U.S. export goods would
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not be subjected to the competitive price disadvantage of
having to include in their prices a U.S. corporate tax on
top of the destination-based foreign VAT.
Economists insist — and with compelling logic — that
any such competitive disadvantage would be offset by
adjustments in currency exchange rates. Businesspeople,
however, do not believe this, and U.S. trade and export
tax policy has attempted to deal with their concerns. Any
competitive disadvantage suffered now by U.S. exporters
would disappear under e-VAT, which would replace the
U.S. corporate income tax with a U.S. destination-based
VAT.

F. Financial Institutions
Payments to banks or other financial institutions for
savings or investment purposes should of course be
exempt from the VAT and should not be subject to
automatic payment by the financial institution to a
government tax collection account. To accomplish this
exclusion, financial institutions would register to obtain a
VAT exemption identification number, so that savings
account deposits and other savings transfers would be
coded as exempt savings deposits. This mechanism
should not create a problem. Indeed, the exemption
would assist in uncovering and identifying foreign bank
accounts of U.S. persons, because foreign financial institutions would also have to register to obtain a VAT
exemption and an exemption identification number.
This mechanism would be largely self-enforcing. That
is because a foreign financial institution’s failure to
register as VAT-exempt or otherwise disclose that it was
a foreign financial institution would trigger an automatic
VAT payment to the government when the saver transferred funds to the institution. Thus, this mechanism
would ensure that all financial institutions register to
qualify for VAT exemption. This identification could then
lead the taxing authority to audit, if deemed appropriate,
any purchases or other expenditures made by the U.S.
person out of the account at the foreign financial institution to determine whether the purchase was subject to
uncollected U.S. VAT.
However, not all payments to financial institutions
like banks and insurance companies are simply exempt
flows of capital intended for savings purposes. Some
payments may very well be for services such as, in the
case of a bank, maintaining a cost-free checking account,
facilitating and making online payments to merchants on
behalf of depositors, collecting checks transferred to a
bank for collection, and providing free ATM services. For
a life insurance company, the services would include the
assumption of the risk of an insured’s early death as a
component of a cash value life insurance policy. These
amounts that are paid for services should not be exempted from the VAT. Often savings and payment for
services are bundled together, making it difficult to
separate the services portion and subjecting only that
portion to tax.
The obvious solution is to require financial institutions
to unbundle the services portion and charge a VAT on
that portion by requiring all transfers to the institution to
be coded as partially exempt and partially taxable under
the VAT. However, that may prove mechanically difficult
as a practical matter, and a percentage allocation rule
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member countries, would be subject to U.S. Customs,
which would facilitate tax collection and tracking of
importers who go missing. Moreover, importers could be
required to be certified, which would avoid missing
traders.
However, the more important distinction between
e-VAT and the EU VAT is that e-VAT ensures immediate
tax collection because it is automatic and electronic.
Under e-VAT, a missing trader could never collect tax and
skip town. As a result, e-VAT could do for the VAT what
withholding has done for the income tax — namely,
ensure immediate tax payment, instead of allowing taxpayers to wait until the end of the year to pay their taxes.
Indeed, e-VAT would extend even further than the current withholding system: E-VAT would allow the government to reap the benefits of withholding in every
transaction while income tax withholding applies to only
a fraction of income-generating transactions.
Thus, on balance, VAT proponents are correct that
compliance will be a lesser problem in a U.S. credit VAT
system than it has been in the current income tax. This
conclusion is bolstered by the fact that under e-VAT, one
should expect that the compliance problems would be
largely eliminated for credit or other electronic transactions.
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G. Sales Tax as a Comparison
A national sales tax, like a VAT, lends itself to electronic collection. This section, however, advocates a
credit-style VAT over a retail sales tax, because a VAT
collects tax at all stages of production and is thus less
easily evaded than a retail sales tax. Further, a VAT
facilitates a second-level wage tax, as explained earlier,
which can build progressivity into the tax system.
H. State Taxes
Most states collect their own taxes through either an
income tax or a sales tax, or both. VAT opponents have
suggested that adoption of a federal VAT to replace the
federal income tax would make taxing income at the state
level substantially more difficult, perhaps impossible as a
practical matter, and would crowd out states’ ability to
raise revenue through sales taxes.
Dissuading states from relying on state income taxes,
however, represents an extra benefit of eliminating the
federal income tax and moving to e-VAT: One would
expect elimination of the state income taxes with the end
of the federal income tax.
If states decided to replace their state income taxes
with state e-VATs, the state tax could be added onto the
federal e-VAT and collected by the federal taxing authority and remitted to the states. This would allow both
federal and state VAT payments and credits to be
handled in a single procedure. However, in the case of a
state e-VAT, the added complication of VAT collected in
one state and wages paid to employees who reside in
another state would have to be dealt with by the states,
hopefully in a uniform manner. In contrast, if states
wanted to use a sales tax in addition to or instead of a
state e-VAT, any state could of course do so. Appending
a state retail sales tax to a federal e-VAT should be
relatively easy.
I. Transition Considerations
There are many transition issues that come with
replacing the current income tax with a consumption tax
as the exclusive means of raising revenue. They would
exist regardless of whether the consumption tax takes the
form of a sales tax, a VAT, e-VAT, the Hall-Rabushka flat
tax, or a cash flow consumed income tax. The most
important transition problem is the loss of existing
wealth or purchasing power. However, an in-depth discussion of this important question is outside the scope of
this report and is the subject of another published article
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by this author.56 As a result, this portion of the report will
focus on other transition issues.
Hall and Rabushka, in their two-tier consumption tax
proposal, identified several transition issues that would
need to be confronted, particularly in simplifying the
individual wage-earner portion of the tax. First and
foremost was the treatment of home mortgage interest.
Under a VAT, either a credit method as under e-VAT or a
subtraction method as under the Hall-Rabushka flat tax,
interest income is not includible in the tax base. Correspondingly, interest expense is not deductible under a
subtraction VAT, nor does it give rise to a VAT credit
under a credit-style VAT. Similarly, interest expense does
not give rise to a deduction for wage earners in their
wage tax component. This change would represent a
windfall to creditors and a disaster to debtors. This
would especially be the case in which the debtor is a
homeowner because of the size of the home mortgage
interest deduction allowed for many homeowners relative to their income and other assets.
Hall and Rabushka contend that once the rules for
their proposed consumption tax were fully phased in,
equilibrium home mortgage interest would adjust downward to compensate for the nonincludability to creditors
and nondeductibility to debtors. But what of the preexisting mortgages that carry the higher, previous market
interest rates? For those, Hall and Rabushka offered
debtors and creditors a choice: They could leave the
mortgage terms intact and be taxed under the old
inclusion/deduction rules, or they could agree to a
reduced interest rate and have the interest be
nonincludable/nondeductible.57 The same transition
choice would work for e-VAT.
Hall and Rabushka have suggested some other transition rules and posed other transition choices.58 These
are all relevant to e-VAT as well. Importantly, the automatic and electronic collection attribute of e-VAT would
not add to the difficulties of transition. Indeed, it could
help speed up the development — and facilitate improvement — of existing technology to track and report
electronic transactions.

J. Special Circumstances
The system described in this report appears simple,
straightforward, secure, and relatively inexpensive to
administer for everyday sales of goods and payment for
services. Interpretative questions and unusual situations
will arise, however, as they do under other VAT systems
used around the world, and the body of learning and
experience that has evolved over many years and many
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For an in-depth discussion of these transition issues, see
Daniel S. Goldberg, ‘‘The Aches and Pains of Transition to a
Consumption Tax: Can We Get There From Here?’’ 26 Va. Tax
Rev. 447 (2007).
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Hall and Rabushka, supra note 14, at 73-75.
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See also Robert E. Hall and Alvin Rabushka, ‘‘Putting the
Flat Tax Into Action,’’ in Robert E. Hall et al., Fairness and
Efficiency in the Flat Tax, 3 (1996); Hall and Rabushka, Low Tax,
Simple Tax, Flat Tax, 68 (1983).

1369

(C) Tax Analysts 2010. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

might have to be adopted to perform that function. In the
case of a bank, the taxable portion would presumably be
determined by the spread between what the depositor
earns on the deposits and what the bank earns when it
lends that money in the ordinary course of its business.
That spread reflects the bank’s business gross profit,
offset by the products and services it purchases from
other businesses, for which a VAT credit would be
allowed. This is the type of solution that Hall and
Rabushka favored in their flat tax. The unbundling
problem for life insurance companies would be easier
because of the existence of term life insurance contracts,
which would establish a market price for mortality risk
assumption.
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See Alan Schenk and Oliver Oldman, Value Added Tax: A
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subjected to tax. The benefits from simplification would
have to be weighed against the possibility of complete
avoidance of the VAT (presumably, only on the value
added by the immediate seller) by retail sellers that sell
indirectly to customers through intermediaries acting in
the guise of a purchaser and a casual seller.
For instance, there is a scam in the United Kingdom
known as ‘‘car flipping.’’60 In the United Kingdom, used
property is not subject to a VAT. In one iteration of that
scam, an importer purchases a car and equips it with
handicap controls at a relatively modest cost before
selling it to a middleman. A car with those fittings is
exempt from the VAT. The middleman removes the
handicap fittings and resells the car as ‘‘used’’ for VAT
purposes, making the car free of the VAT. Can this type of
transaction be discovered? Of course it can; that is, if the
revenue authorities are looking for it. However, the major
goal of e-VAT is to avoid that type of administrative
vigilance and oversight. Consequently, e-VAT could be
implemented by taxing resales and allowing a credit for
previously paid tax, the records for which should be
available electronically. Alternatively, the extra burden of
cascading (VAT without credit for previously paid tax)
might have to be endured by the casual reseller. The
decision about which method should be used can await
the adoption of e-VAT.
2. Personal residences. The e-VAT proposal could impose a tax on the purchaser of a primary residence. This
tax, if required to be paid at closing, however, would
substantially increase a buyer’s cash needs at closing.
Accordingly, e-VAT could allow the purchaser to elect to
pay the tax over 30 years, with interest.61 This treatment
of primary residences would differ from that of the
purchase of other residences used for consumption, for
which VAT would be due on purchase, but which could
be financed privately.62 If the taxpayer elects to defer
payment of the tax for the primary residence, the full
amount would become due on resale of the home.63
If the resale of the house is subject to VAT, then,
consistent with an attempt to avoid cascading, the seller
of the house should be permitted a credit for the tax
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See Ainsworth, supra note 53.
This was the solution chosen under the national retail sales
tax that was proposed several years ago by Reps. Dan Schaefer
and Billy Tauzin in the National Retail Sales Tax Act of 1996,
H.R. 3039, 104th Cong. (1996). The national sales tax proposal is
explored in great detail in David R. Burton and Dan R. Mastromarco, Emancipating America from the Income Tax — How the
National Sales Tax Would Work (1997), available at http://
www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-272es.html (hereinafter Burton
and Mastromarco No. 1). See also Burton and Mastromarco, ‘‘The
National Sales Tax: Moving Beyond the Idea,’’ Tax Notes, May
27, 1996, p. 1237, Doc 96-15679, or 96 TNT 104-88 (hereinafter
Burton and Mastromarco No. 2). Burton and Mastromarco
provide a specific method regarding how the national sales tax
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This is consistent with the national sales tax proposal.
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places can be drawn on to deal with them.59 Importantly,
under e-VAT, any problems that will arise can be dealt
with and implemented at the business taxpayer level,
which is the focus of e-VAT and in which complexity is
most appropriately addressed.
Special circumstances, however, may require some
modifications to the general procedures. This section will
discuss some of these circumstances next.
1. Used property. Under the theory of e-VAT, the sale of
used property, except financial assets, would be subject to
tax. Ordinarily, however, tangible property — such as
used automobiles and household appliances — is unlikely to increase in value, so imposing a tax on the sale
of those items would double-tax them because a tax was
already paid when the items were originally purchased
by the seller. Thus, under a VAT system such as e-VAT, a
credit would be allowed for tax previously paid on used
property that is later resold. The credit, which would be
nonrefundable, would usually obviate the need for collecting an additional tax at the point of sale. Under a
credit-style VAT, the credit would theoretically be available, although, as a practical matter, consumers who sell
used property would not likely have procedures established to make easy use of it.
However, in some circumstances, used property does
appreciate in value. An example is previously owned
artwork, which can continue to appreciate regardless of
its previous ownership. To avoid double taxation or
cascading of tax, a credit would be allowed for the tax
previously paid by the seller, which would offset some,
but not all, of the VAT due on the later sale of the used
property that had appreciated in value.
Collection of the tax on the sale of used property
would not be as easy as tax collection from taxpayers
engaged in the business of retail sales. Because electronic
transactions would be the norm for retail sellers and
intermediate goods producers, the mechanism for collecting the VAT would be automatic and inexpensive. In
contrast, for casual sellers, substantial payments would
eventually also be electronic, but the automatic imposition of a VAT on the gross amount would require a claim
to be made for a credit in the amount of the VAT
previously paid. It may be that retrieval of records of the
VAT previously paid would be required and would
involve some difficulty, even though the original sale was
logged in a database. A decision would have to be made
regarding whether to forgo collection of the VAT on the
casual sale of used property. A decision to forgo tax
collection in that case could be justified, because casual
sales of property are not commonplace occurrences. In
the alternative, the mechanics of the process could be
solved for some kinds of property. For example, property
such as automobiles could be subjected to federal tax on
registration in the same manner that automobiles are
now subjected to state sales tax.
Finally, the availability of the credit may need to be
sacrificed to achieve a simpler system. Arguably, in the
interests of simplification, casual resales should not be
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Second, the loss of revenue is most serious when the
property or services on both sides of the barter transactions are ultimately used for consumption. To the extent
that one side of the barter transaction is in the production
process, the purchaser of that side will not be entitled to
a credit for any VAT paid, so the tax-free acquisition of
services will ultimately be taxed on resale of the finished
product. While a similar situation occurs under the
income tax, in that the business taxpayer is not entitled to
a deduction for bartered services, taxpayers may in effect
obtain a deduction to the extent of their basis in the
transferred property, particularly if the transferred property is reflected as cost of goods sold as it is no longer in
inventory. Further, under the income tax, there is no
assurance that both sides of the barter transaction will be
reported consistently, that is, there is no assurance that
the failure to report a receipt in income will be offset by
the inability of the other side to report a deduction. In
contrast, under e-VAT, the failure to report the transaction entirely would automatically affect both sides of the
exchange in a consistent manner.
Third, to the extent that barter transactions require
policing, there will be more resources available to do the
policing under e-VAT because of the significant savings
from eliminating the income tax system.70 Whereas unreported income would continue to be a problem under
the income tax system, it can be reduced substantially
under e-VAT.
As for the underground economy in which sales take
place using cash, e-VAT should fare better than the
current income tax, which fails to collect tax on these
sales. The replacement of currency transactions with
electronic transactions over time will significantly reduce
the loss of tax revenues from the underground economy
under e-VAT. To the extent that substantial amounts of
money pass in the underground economy, the money
must be transferred electronically and the tax will be
assessed automatically. The remaining loss of revenue
under the proposed system should be minor compared to
the current income tax. There is a necessary caveat here:
To the extent there is expanded use of true ‘‘e-money’’ (a
form of privately issued electronic currency71), the accountability to the government of transactions that use
e-money may become doubtful.72 If this is permitted to
occur, keeping track of these transactions in a manner
sufficient to ensure proper collection of a point-of-sale tax
may become correspondingly more troublesome. This
situation would mirror the difficulties that the central

70
Since the cost of administering a point-of-sale tax would be
significantly less than the current tax system, see Goldberg,
‘‘Currency-Free Economy,’’ supra note 22, at 52 and nn.310-314,
resources would be freed up to address the issue of policing
barter transactions.
71
In other words, e-money arises from third-party promises
in the form of Internet accounts whose balances have no
counterpart in any deposits at a financial institution. Id. at 8 and
nn.32-33.
72
True e-money could be developed to protect the anonymity
of its owner and to prevent traceability. This anonymous
e-money would also make the owner’s identity unavailable for
purposes of attaching tax liability. Id. at 8-10 and nn.34-47.
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previously paid by him.64 The transaction would be
recorded in county land records, so verification of the
allowable credit should not be difficult.65
Alternatively, previously owned houses can be treated
as used property and not subjected to VAT on resale. The
government would forgo tax on the appreciation of the
house. This system would then favor previously owned
houses, which can be purchased free of VAT, to newly
constructed houses, which are subject to VAT.
Finally, all house sales could be subject to VAT, but
rather than allowing the seller to use a VAT credit for the
VAT previously paid on his purchase of the house, the
homeowner who purchases a replacement home could be
permitted to apply the amount of tax previously paid on
his first house as a credit against the tax due on his
second house.66
Consistency would suggest that the VAT credit should
be allowed on the sale of the house, like a normal VAT
transaction, rather than applied to the VAT on the replacement house.67
In any event, because of the size of the transaction and
its importance to the participants as well as the usual
participation of financial intermediaries, the automatic
electronic payment of the applicable tax would not create
a significant additional administrative burden.68
3. Barter transactions and the underground economy.
Barter transactions and the underground economy have
posed significant problems under the income tax system.69 Barter takes place without any cash being transferred and therefore readily avoids detection by tax
revenue authorities. It is particularly troublesome when
services are used as payment, because the entire value of
the property or services received in exchange for other
services, which would ordinarily be included in income,
can escape taxation. Similarly, transactions in the underground economy escape taxation because cash is used,
enabling these transactions to avoid detection. Both types
of transactions present similar problems for a system that
taxes transactions at the point of sale, and both must be
addressed under the e-VAT proposal.
However, the magnitude of the problem will likely be
less, both with barter transactions and with the underground economy. First, one would expect that the tax rate
imposed on business sales under e-VAT would be lower
than the tax rate imposed under the current, steeply
progressive income tax on a high-bracket seller. As such,
the amount of revenue lost to evasion would also be
smaller.
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IV. Conclusion
E-VAT differs from the previously proposed two-tier
taxes — the Hall-Rabushka flat tax and Bradford’s X-Tax
— in that it uses a credit-method VAT instead of a
subtraction VAT. It also explicitly integrates the estate
and gift taxes. However, in almost all respects, e-VAT will
not alter the macroeconomic conclusions of Hall,
Rabushka, and Bradford regarding the shift to these
consumption taxes, aside from the greater ease of border
adjustments inherent in a credit VAT over a subtraction
VAT.76
In contrast to the flat tax and X-Tax, e-VAT is a
transaction tax and thus facilitates point-of-sale collection. It permits greater progressivity than a straight
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Id. at 61 and nn.330-331. If a central bank, such as the
Federal Reserve Bank, would be unable to trace the path of
e-money, it follows that tax collection would experience the
same difficulties using similar technology.
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Charles E. McLure Jr., ‘‘State and Local Implications of a
Federal Value-Added Tax,’’ Tax Notes, Mar. 28, 1988, p. 1517; see
also Frederick J. Bradshaw IV, ‘‘Tax Relief and the Competitiveness of U.S. Exporters,’’ Tax Notes, Oct. 7, 2002, p. 129, Doc
2002-22624, or 2002 TNT 195-90 (explaining that indirect taxes,
like the credit-invoice VAT, are eligible for border tax adjustments under the current international trade regime while direct
taxes, like the subtraction VAT, are not).
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business-level VAT, because the separate wage tax component of the tax allows for flexibility in tax rates,
exemptions, and deductions. Although this characteristic
might appear to be a simple detail without a significant
conceptual difference, the characteristic of taxing transactions and dispensing with annual accounting would in
fact make an enormous practical difference. It would
facilitate electronic collection and auditing to ensure
compliance. This characteristic should thereby reduce
costs of compliance after initial start-up expenses of
programming, and it should significantly reduce the tax
gap.
E-VAT takes advantage of computer technology that
will only improve as the 21st century progresses and the
economy continues to shift away from cash transactions
to electronic transactions, including debit cards, credit
cards, and EFTs. These methods of payment have become
not only commonplace, but also dominant in commerce.
Accordingly, the time has come for a change in the tax
system.
Benjamin Franklin said after the U.S. Constitution was
drafted: ‘‘You have a republic, gentlemen, if you can keep
it.’’ The same caution holds with the adoption of e-VAT.
Congress should avoid making special taxing rules or
rates for different businesses or commodities. There is no
opportunity in e-VAT for tax expenditures at the business
level if all business-level tax rates and rules are kept
uniform. In any event, e-VAT does not lend itself well to
tax expenditures at the business level, and that is a good
thing; it is a feature, not a bug, in the system.
The same might not be said for the wage tax part of
e-VAT, because the legal incidence of that portion of the
tax is shifted to the wage earner. That part, therefore,
lends itself to legislative enactments of a home mortgage
interest deduction, deduction for state taxes, deduction
for charitable contributions, and so forth. Although nothing is foolproof, starting over with a new tax is more
likely to produce a better result than trying to fix an
existing mess, just as preventing a food fight from
starting in a school cafeteria is easier than stopping one
that has already erupted.
Also, e-VAT allows for progressivity, comparable to
the income tax, because it recognizes political reality, as
do many other proponents of consumption taxes, at least
at the low wage end. One would hope that e-VAT would
have only two tax levels: a zero level for low-wage
earners and another level for all other wage earners.
Moreover, e-VAT importantly limits the effect of progressivity to wages; it does not subject investment income to
tax. Progressivity is best evaluated by taking spending
decisions as well as taxing decisions into account. Under
this analysis, one could effectuate wealth redistribution
on the spending side by providing public services, such
as quality schools and healthcare, free or at subsidized
costs.
Finally, e-VAT provides the prospect of a return-free
tax system for individuals if tax expenditure deductions
can be avoided. That prospect might even prompt Congress to replace tax expenditures with direct government
expenditures, which would make the fiscal system more
transparent and eliminate the need for the tax expenditure budget.
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bank money regulators would likely encounter if they
sought to monitor the money supply and to protect users
of e-money — as well as others affected by it — from
potential financial meltdown in the event of a failure of
one or more issuers.73
However, at least for transactions that are not illegal,
presumably major issuers of e-money will be generally
known.74 Otherwise, the e-money would not be widely
accepted.75 Thus, the taxing authorities should be able to
identify e-money issuers and force compliance with
e-VAT’s requirement of reporting and collection of tax, at
least from domestic issuers.
It is hard to discuss and resolve potential tax problems
involving e-money at this point, however, because
e-money is currently more hypothetical than real. As a
result, it is extremely difficult to foresee with any precision how regulators will hold issuers of e-money accountable. Once issues around e-money become clearer,
there likely will be a way to ensure that e-money transactions are traceable by taxing authorities.
4. Gifts. Cash gifts that are made electronically because
they pass through the banking system become traceable
and taxable under e-VAT. If gifts were excluded from the
transaction tax base as well as from the gift tax (for
example, because they were within the annual exclusion
amount), they would have to be specially identified at the
time of the transfer to avoid the automatic assessment
under e-VAT. Unlike gifts under the current tax system,
there would be a trail because of the required identification of the transfer as a gift. That would facilitate taxation
of wealth transfers if the amounts are large as well as
audits if the government desired verification.
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V. Appendix A: Tax-Inclusive vs. Tax-Exclusive Rate

77
Tax-inclusive rates can be converted into tax-exclusive
rates by the following formula:
re = ri/(1-ri)
Conversely, tax-exclusive rates can be converted into taxinclusive rates by the following formula:
ri = re/(1+re)

TAX NOTES, September 27, 2010

B. Apples and Oranges
The difference between tax-inclusive taxes, such as the
present income tax, and tax-exclusive taxes, such as state
sales taxes, has caused substantial confusion at the grassroots level in tax policy debates. As explained above, the
difference lies entirely in how the tax rate is expressed
and whether the proponent of the tax prefers the lower
tax-inclusive rate to the higher tax-exclusive rate, and
whether the proponent wants the tax to be less transparent to the consumer (including it as part of the price) or
more transparent to the consumer (collecting it as an
add-on to the listed price).
Proponents of retaining the income tax often compare
the income tax rates to what VAT or sales tax rates would
have to be to raise the same amount of revenue. As
explained above, this comparison between taxes using
tax-inclusive rates and those using tax-exclusive rates
leads to substantial confusion and can be unfair and
misleading.
C. Gross-Up
The connector between a tax-inclusive tax rate and a
tax-exclusive tax rate is the tax lawyer’s concept of
gross-up. Gross-up issues most often arise in the employment context, in which gross-up means including the tax
payment withheld from or credited to the employee in
the employee’s wage income. As such, the withheld tax
payment would both be included in the amount subject
to tax and be a payment of the resulting tax liability. For
example, consider the common arrangement under
which an employee is subject to a tax of $2 on a wage
earned by him, but the employer withheld the $2 and
paid it to the government in discharge of the employee’s
tax liability. The $2 withheld tax amount would be
treated as if the employer paid $2 to the employee who
discharged his own tax liability; that is, the $2 tax would
be included in the employee’s wage income and taxed as
such, even though the employee did not actually receive
the money directly.78
The means by which the concept of gross-up connects
the two methods of expressing the tax rate is best
explained by following the previous example. As discussed earlier, a tax-inclusive tax rate of 20 percent is
equivalent to a tax-exclusive rate of 25 percent. So if a
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See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
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A. Tax-Inclusive Versus Tax-Exclusive
The examples used in this section assume a 20 percent
tax-inclusive rate. This means that the money used to pay
the tax will be subject to tax. Thus, a tax-inclusive sales
tax rate of 20 percent on a $100 sale means that the sale
price of $100 generates a sales tax of $20, which must be
paid out of the $100 sales proceeds. Similarly, a taxinclusive VAT rate must be paid out of the proceeds as
well.
Unlike the above illustration, the typical state sales tax
is set at a tax-exclusive rate. This means that a sale for $80
subject to a tax-exclusive rate of 25 percent generates a
tax liability of $20, but the liability is added to the
transaction price, so that the seller charges and the buyer
pays the $20 liability in addition to the $80 sales price and
thus pays a total of $100. Importantly, the concept of the
tax — whether a sales tax, a subtraction-method VAT, a
credit-method VAT, or a flat tax — is the same regardless
of whether the tax rate is expressed as tax inclusive or tax
exclusive. Indeed, there is an algebraic relationship77
between a tax-exclusive rate and a tax-inclusive rate that
can be seen by using a simple example. A tax-exclusive
rate of 25 percent is equivalent to a tax-inclusive rate of 20
percent. A sale for $80 subject to a tax-exclusive 25
percent sales tax rate generates $20 in tax liability, or 20
percent of the $100 combined sales proceeds and sales tax
amount. This consequence is the same as the seller selling
the product for $100 subject to a 20 percent tax-inclusive
sales tax, which also generates $20 ($100 x 20 percent) of
sales tax. The same principles hold true with VATs and
the flat tax.
The subtraction-method VAT and the flat tax are
generally discussed and illustrated using a tax-inclusive
tax rate, presumably because of the manner in which
those methods would be collected, which is similar to the
current income tax’s use of a tax-inclusive tax rate (a
taxpayer is taxed on the income used to pay the income
tax liability). In contrast, a sales tax and a credit invoice
VAT are generally discussed and illustrated using a
tax-exclusive tax rate, although in practice these methods
do not have to use a tax-exclusive rate. Yet, as explained
and illustrated above, the two methods represent different ways of describing the same tax and can easily be
compared.
Thus, one can combine a 20 percent tax-inclusive
credit invoice VAT with a 20 percent wage tax, as the
e-VAT proposed in this report would do, with the consequence that the seller’s tax liability is reduced by virtue of
the credit he gets for wages paid by exactly the amount of
the employee’s wage tax liability. For example, under the
foregoing simple rate structure, a $10 wage paid would
generate a credit for the employer of $2 ($10 x 20 percent).

However, if one wanted to use a tax-exclusive credit
invoice VAT computed using a 25 percent tax-exclusive
tax rate and a wage tax computed using a 20 percent
tax-inclusive tax rate, the sale price would be set at $80,
generating a VAT of $20 and a total transaction payment
of $100. The employee’s wage tax would be $2 ($10 x 20
percent), and the employer’s credit would be based on
the employer’s tax liability computation using the employer’s equivalent tax-inclusive rate applied to the
wages. Further, even if the wage tax were more complicated and allowed a zero-rate amount and deductions as
under the proposed e-VAT, the credit would still be
determined based on the employer’s tax-inclusive VAT
rate applied to the wages, despite the actual tax paid by
the wage earner.
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wage earner subject to a tax-inclusive rate of 20 percent is
paid $10 out of which he must satisfy his own tax
liability, he would pay $2 in tax and retain $8. But if the
employer withheld the $2 and paid it to the government,
a 20 percent tax rate applied only to the employee’s $8
take-home pay would yield only $1.60 of tax liability and
thereby fall short of assessing the desired amount of tax,
entitling the employee to a refund. Instead, the $2 withholding must be included as wages, causing wages to
total $10 and the tax at 20 percent to be $2. This inclusion
is referred to as gross-up.
Note that the $2 tax amount in the example above
would result if the take-home wage amount of $8 (which
does not include the tax itself) were taxed at a taxexclusive rate of 25 percent and there were no gross-up.
In other words, a tax-exclusive tax rate of 25 percent
applied only to the take-home $8 and not the withheld $2
would yield the same tax amount as a tax-inclusive wage
tax rate of 20 percent including a gross-up. Thus, a
grossed-up tax-inclusive tax is equivalent to a not
grossed-up tax-exclusive tax. The gross-up in a taxinclusive system ensures that the tax is tax-inclusive and
cannot be made tax-exclusive for the recipient by simply
avoiding the receipt of a direct payment.
If the tax rate structure were varied by including a
zero-rate amount and graduated rates, the algebra and
numerical examples demonstrating the foregoing relationships become more complicated.79 Nevertheless, the
essential concept of the relationship explained above
would remain the same.

79
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